In Remembrance of Memory

 On the 29^th anniversary of the 1989 pro-democracy movement, I thought I would post some of my favorite excerpts from the essays of Liu Xiaobo[i], a participant in the 1989 movement and the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize winner who died in a Chinese prison on July 13, 2017. Written more than 10 years ago, these excerpts continue to resonate for me in this age of Xi Jinping.

 
“The Communist Party of China’s Dictatorial Patriotism” (2005)

In this age of strongman politics, in which Xi Jinping has demanded absolute loyalty to the party, Liu reminds us that we should have no illusion about the nature of one-party rule.

In short, a government can only be qualified to represent the interests of the people, which, when combined, constitute national interests, if it respects and loves the people, and, in particular, if it respects and protects the rights of the people to question, criticize, and even oppose government policies by peaceful means. Only then can it be called a patriotic government and only then is it qualified to promote patriotism.

 However, the patriotism of a dictatorial regime is exactly the opposite: it promotes patriotism with high-flying talk but never respects or cares for the mainstay of the nation—the people. 

First, its power is not conferred by the people but comes from and is sustained by violence. It transforms public power, which is supposed to serve the public good of society, into private power of the regime and the powerful, into a tool for implementing the will of the regime and obtaining profits for the powerful.

The current CPC may be the world’s largest political party, but compared to the 1.3 billion people in China, its 60 some million members are no more than a small minority, so how can it so shamelessly boast that it “represents the people and the nation”? The reason the CPC regards itself to be the natural representative of “the country, the nation, and the people” is not at all because it truly has “the mandate of Heaven to carry out justice,” but because it wants to maintain its dictatorial power and protect its vested interests.

 
“Changing the Regime by Changing Society” (2006)

This is my favorite essay of Liu Xiaobo’s, full of optimism and faith in the power and agency of society, and with wise words about how change will come to China.

In an un-free society ruled by a dictatorship, under the premise of the temporary absence of power that can change the dictatorial nature of the regime, the civic ways that promote the transformation of Chinese society from the bottom up that I know of are as follows:

3. Regardless of how great the freedom-denying power of a regime and its institutions is, every individual should still fight to the best of his/her ability to live as a free person, that is, make every effort to live an honest life with dignity. In any society ruled by dictatorship, when those who pursue freedom publicly disclose their views and practice what they preach, as long as they manage to be fearless in the small details of everyday life, what they say and do in everyday life will become the fundamental force that will topple the system of enslavement.

5. Whether an insider or an outsider of the system, whether working from the top down or the bottom up, each should respect the other’s right to speak. Even the statements and actions of people attached to the government, as long as they do not force constraints on the independent discourse among the people and the rights defense movement, should be regarded as a useful exploration of transformational strategies and their right of speech should be fully respected. Those who advocate transformation from the top down should maintain adequate respect for the explorations of those working from the bottom-up among the people.

6. Institutional common sense on how to confront rather than evade an ever-present dictatorial power: place into one’s own hands the initiative for improving the status of the population without rights, rather than pinning hope on the arrival of some enlightened master or benevolent ruler. In the strategic maneuvering between civil society and the government, regardless of how official policies may change, the most important thing is to encourage and assist the civil rights defense movement and hold fast the independent position of civil society.

In sum, China’s course toward a free society will mainly rely on bottom-up gradual improvement and not the top-down “Chiang Ching-kuo style” revolution. Bottom-up reform requires self-consciousness among the people, and self-initiated, persistent, and continuously expanding civil disobedience movements or rights defense movements among the people. In other words, pursue the free and democratic forces among the people; do not pursue the rebuilding of society through radical regime change, but instead use gradual social change to compel regime change. That is, rely on the continuously growing civil society to reform a regime that lacks legitimacy.

“The Many Aspects of Chinese Communist Party Dictatorship” (2006)

Here Liu delves further into the nature of a one-party regime, which is increasingly propped up by coercion and economic enticements than through any ideological belief in communism, and questions its lasting power.

The CCP regime suppresses dissident political forces in a variety of ways: shadowing, wiretapping and imprisonment, as well as bribery and coercion; evil laws and low schemes, as well as gray space; regime dictatorship, as well as thug violence; open criticism and, secret purges; ironfisted methods, as well as appeals to human emotion (the police officers in charge of keeping watch on dissidents invariably start up their conversations in a “getting-acquainted” tone), to the extent that even when reining in those intractable rebels, the police leave themselves some leeway in that they no longer claim to be motivated by high-sounding ideological reasons, but rather deploy the “rice-bowl theory” that they are simply trying to keep their jobs.

However, the very use of such pragmatic, flexible control methods, because of their thoroughly opportunistic nature, paints the doomsday picture of dictatorial politics—countless flaws in the system itself, questions of the regime’s legitimacy, and rapid erosion of its effectiveness—where the ruler and the ruled engage in expedient cooperation based on the principle of profit-before-everything.

“The Negative Effects of the Rise of Dictatorship on Democratization in the World” (2006)

In this essay, Liu foreshadows the growing concern about the effect that China’s rise has had in shaping global norms and standards concerning development, governance, democracy and human rights.

The CPC regime has replaced the former Soviet Union to become a blood transfusion machine for other dictatorships. It provides large quantities of economic assistance to dictatorships such as North Korea, Cuba, and Myanmar, offsetting to some degree the impact of Western economic sanctions and enabling these remaining despotic regimes on their last legs to linger on.

The CPC regime uses China’s huge market to lure and coerce big capital from the West, and the very nature of capital is to chase profit with no regard for universal values or fair trade. So the big capital from various Western nations inevitably tries to exert influence on its home country’s China policy…..To make a profit, these companies have gone as far as to recklessly betray universal values and the American government’s human rights foreign policy. Without exception, they have all bowed to political pressure and coercion from the CPC regime and have become its accomplices in restricting the freedom of expression and in its literary inquisition.

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[i] English-language translations of these essays are available on Human Rights in China (HRIC)’s website.

Improving Human Rights Through Social Change

Last Monday, I was invited to participate in a briefing on Capitol Hill to Congressional staffers on the topic of "Human Rights and Social Change".  It was an opportunity for me to think through the U.S. government's (and more generally the U.S.) approach to the human rights issue in China.  Here are my remarks:

The way in which we view China is shaped strongly by our own political, social and cultural biases.  We tend to focus on areas that are of importance to us: human rights, rule of law, treatment of ethnic minorities, rights-based activities, freedom of expression and religion, etc.   What we might call political and civil rights.  These are important issues not only to Americans but to the larger international community, but we should keep in mind that they come out of a specific political, social and cultural context, and are not necessarily the most important issues to many in China’s civil society.  These are also areas where the party-state has been more vigilant in opposing reforms, partly because they perceive outside forces pushing hard for changes in these areas.  

The problem is that in focusing so much of our attention and energies on these areas, we have developed blind spots in other areas where change is occurring in a more organic fashion, using strategies and methods that are generally accepted and have proved effective in China.   These changes have not resulted in the kinds of change we in the U.S. would like to see, particularly a stronger, more independent legal system, and greater protection of legal rights, and the expansion of freedom of expression and religion, for Chinese citizens.  But they are nonetheless important changes that have resulted in the expansion of civil society broadly defined.  This civil society consisting of voluntary, private, self-governing initiatives, organizations, networks and movements has been growing in numbers and in the diversity of actors involved.   They include lawyers, journalists, academics, ordinary activists, NGOs, foundations, informal and virtual groups and networks, and even the occasional government official.

I would argue that we need to do a better job understanding how social action and change is unfolding in China before we try to impose our own template of how political and social change should occur.  Why and how has civil society continued to grow through the cycles of relaxation and repression that we keep hearing about in the international media?   What are the consequences of this growth?   Where will it lead?  What if anything can the U.S. government do to support civil society?

We’ve been very good about identifying and calling attention to the ways in which the government has sought to stifle and repress civil society.  It seems that every week we read news about activists, writers, lawyers,  and monks being restricted, detained, disappeared or arrested.  We’ve also done a fairly good job of identifying acts of “mass disturbances”, strikes, protests, riots.  But again, these stories are consistent with our concern for rule of law, freedom of expression and religion, and the treatment of ethnic minorities. 

What we hear little about are the stories that do not get the attention of journalists.  Stories about the quiet work that is being done behind the scenes, the emergence of social actors promoting change in less public ways, the growth of social and virtual networks, and the growing collaboration between civil society actors, the government and business sectors.   These are areas where civil society is trying escape marginalization and join the mainstream of Chinese society.  They are also trends that get little mention in the media and in U.S. government human rights reports.

Information about these changes is not lacking.  It is available and being documented by academics, bloggers, and organizations like China Development Brief.  But it does not seem to be filtering up to those in the U.S. government.

Just to give one important change that has happened recently is the rapid rise of private foundations which offer another means of support for civil society.  The rise of foundations established by private entrepreneurs suggests that the private sector is gradually becoming more socially engaged.  Their support of civil society, while not a direct statement supporting political reform, shows their support for an organizational sphere independent of the party-state.  The coming together of private entrepreneurs and civil society has been gathering speed over the last two years.  It represents a very significant event that is beginning to change the civil society landscape because now you have independent foundations with lots of money and influence.  The question is, will they support civil society? 

The always insightful Liu Xiaobo, the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, recognizes the importance of social change in reforming the political environment in China.  In his 2006 essay, “Changing the Regime by Changing Society”, he states:

“China’s course toward a free society will mainly rely on bottom-up gradual improvement and not the top-down ‘Chiang Ching-kuo style’ revolution.  Bottom-up reform requires self-consciousness among the people, and self-initiated, persistent and continuously expanding civil disobedience movements or rights defense movements among the people.  In other words, pursue the free and democratic forces among the people; do not pursue the rebuilding of society through radical regime change, but instead use gradual social change to compel regime change.  That is, rely on the continuously growing civil society to reform a regime that lacks legitimacy.”

The Best and Worst of 2010 for China's NGOs

January 13, 2011

I generally avoid these kinds of lists, but then got emails from two different people in the NGO community, each with their own list of what had happened in 2010 that were complete opposites.  One listed all good things, and the other listed all the bad things.  This led me to construct my own list that seeks to reconcile these very opposite views of what happened in China's civil society sector in 2010.  The reality is that if you combined both of these lists, you wouldn't be far off the mark.  The year 2010 was truly a schizophrenic year for Chinese civil society with rapid progress in the Chinese philanthropic sector, but setbacks for grassroots NGOs in other sectors.  If 2008 was seen by many as the “Year of the NGO” then 2010 could be said to be the “Year of Philanthropy”.  It was (with apologies to Charles Dickens) the “best of times and the worst of times” for China’s civil society. 

Following are some (and I stress “some” because this list is by no means exhaustive) of the best and worst moments of 2010 for China’s civil society.

The Best of 2010

APRIL – after the Yushu earthquake in Qinghai, a number of NGOs participated in the earthquake relief, including NGO networks that had formed in response to the Wenchuan earthquake, as well as new networks.

APRIL – The Green Choice Alliance, a group of 34 grassroots NGOs, among them Friends of Nature, Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs and Green Beagle, released an investigative report on heavy metal pollution from the information and technology sector.  The Alliance is yet another sign of the growth and maturation of China’s civil society networks.

JUNE -- The Beijing Normal University Philanthropy Research Institute was established with funding from Jet Li’s One Foundation.  In a move that signals how much progress civil society has made in China, Wang Zhenyao resigned his post as a government official in the Ministry of Civil Affairs to head the Institute.  The Institute will provide training and counseling to promote professional philanthropic talen in China.

JULY -- The China Foundation Center was established after a decade of effort led by private foundation leaders such as Naruda’s Xu Yongguang.   The CFC is modeled after the U.S. Foundation Center and seeks to strengthen transparency and accountability in China’s foundation sector, and thereby strengthen public trust in philanthropy, by providing a database on foundations' financials, activities, and performance. 

In response to public dissatisfaction with government restrictions on fundraising for the Yushu earthquake (see the Worst of 2010 below), the Ministry of Civil Affairs established a special office to collect public opinions. With more than 420 million internet users and more than 805 mobile phone users in China, this mechanism may be an opportunity for social media to shape policy making in China.

SEPTEMBER -- The Social Innovation Forum in Shanghai—also called the New Philanthropy Carnival—was organized by the China Social Entrepreneur Foundation (or YouChange) to encourage new thinking on addressing China’s social, economic, and environmental challenges. The Shanghai municipal government was one of the first local governments to invest in and support social innovation centers in China.

SEPTEMBER -- Business for Social Responsibility (BSR) launched CiYuan, an initiative that builds innovative, cross-sector partnerships to enhance the value of social investment in China. Working with the Taproot Foundation, BSR will introduce a skills-based volunteerism model in China to leverage corporate human capital to build NGO capacity.

SEPTEMBER --Bill Gates and Warren Buffett held a dialogue with Chinese billionaires about investing their money in philanthropy.  The dialogue generated a nationwide discussion on how China’s growing class of wealthy entrepreneurs in China can make social investments and become strategic philanthropists. 

About this time, news also came out about the Shenzhen experiment to make it easier for NGOs to register.  Jet Li’s One Foundation was able to use the more liberal rules to register as a public foundation (see below).   These experiments have been going on for some time and in different localities for different types of social organizations, and illustrate just how complex and fluid the regulatory environment for nonprofits is in China. 

OCTOBER -- Liu Xiaobo receives the Nobel Peace Prize.

JANUARY 2011  (Ok, technically not a 2010 event but close enough!)  The Jet Li One Foundation was the first private foundation to be legally registered as a public fundraising foundation in Shenzhen— yet another sign that the government is loosening its control over philanthropy.  

The Worst of 2010

FEBRUARY -- the Ministry of Education issued a notice asking all Chinese universities to not work with Oxfam HK and other international NGOs that seek to recruit college volunteers for their projects. 

MARCH (This story did not come out in the media until March, 2010 when these new regulations went into effect but other sources say the regulation was first issued in December of 2009) -- the State Administration of Foreign Exchange issued a new set of regulations that made it more difficult for Chinese enterprises to receive donations from foreign organizations by asking for notarization and additional paperwork.  These regulations have especially made life harder for grassroots NGOs registered as businesses who are receiving funds from international donors.
 
MARCH – Peking University announced that it was disassociating itself from the well-known NGO, Peking University Women’s Legal Aid Center.  The Center continues to operate and has registered as both a law firm and an enterprise.

MARCH -- NGOCN (NGO Development and Exchange Network), a Kunming-based NGO that serves as a information clearinghouse and training center for grassroots NGOs was closed down, supposedly for encouraging NGOs to participate in activities to combat the drought in southwestern China.  It has since reemerged as NGOCN.info.
 
MAY -- Since January 14, 2010, Beijing Aizhixing Institute, one of China’s foremost HIV/AIDS NGOs has been investigated and harassed by numerous government departments, and faced difficulty in getting its funds.  In May, saying he could no longer tolerate the harassment, Wan Yanhai, founder of Beijing Aizhixing, left for the U.S. with his family.

SUMMER – Authorities sought to restrict NGO participation in the Yushu earthquake, asking a network of Qinghai NGOs to disband, and restricting NGOs from fundraising for the earthquake.  The Ministry of Civil Affairs asked 15 national-level foundations to turn the relief funds they had raised over to relevant government agencies so the funds could be better managed.

NOVEMBER – One the eve of World AIDS Day 2010, another AIDS organization, Ai Yuan, “Beijing Loving Source Information Consulting Center" announced that it was closing its doors because of tax audits by Beijing tax authorities.
 
NOVEMBER – Liang Congjie, founder of Friends of Nature and one of the leaders of the first generation of China’s NGO leaders, passed away in Beijing.

DECEMBER – A number of activists who were invited to Oslo for Liu Xiaobo’s Nobel Peace Prize ceremony were not allowed out of the country.

Finally, the Charity Law that was expected to come out this year was held up for further review in the NPC.  Revisions of the registration and management regulations for social organizations continue to be held up as they have for the past few years.

The big question of course is why we’re seeing this schizophrenic pattern in China’s civil society.  I’ll address this question in my next blog.