Showing posts with label "China Development Brief". Show all posts
Showing posts with label "China Development Brief". Show all posts

Sunday, March 12, 2017

Putting the Overseas NGO Law in Perspective


There hasn't been much news since the announcements in January of 32 foreign NGOs registering in Shanghai, Beijing and Guangdong. In the meantime, several in-depth articles have appeared on the Overseas NGO Law and its implementation.

One article, The Origins of China's New Law on Foreign NGOs, was written by yours truly and was published in ChinaFile in early January as a more polished version of an earlier blogpost.

Another article, Overseas NGOs in China: Left in Legal Limbo, was published in the Diplomat in early March by Kristin Shi-Kupfer and Bertram Lang, two China experts, at the Mecator Institute for China Studies, a private think-tank based in Berlin.

Soon after, Jia Xijing, a well-respected expert on Chinese civil society at Tsinghua University's NGO Research Center and a strong supporter of an independent civil society in China, published a long, very detailed article, China's Implementation of the Overseas NGO Law, in the Southern Weekly (南方周某)(the English-language and Chinese-language version of the article can be found on China Development Brief's website).

These articles are valuable because they give us some much needed perspective on how the law came to be, and its historical and political significance. This perspective is particularly important given the perception of mutual mistrust between the Chinese government and NGOs, and the lack of detailed information and guidance about the law's implementation from Chinese authorities. It's an environment ripe for misperception and misunderstanding, short-term thinking and behavior. Reports of foreign NGOs closing their offices and leaving China, Chinese NGO partners withdrawing from projects, and directives from local authorities seeking to implement the law in their jurisdictions, can easily lead NGOs to make judgements based on misinformation or misconceptions. The easy conclusion to draw is that a crackdown on NGOs in imminent. 

I think we should resist the temptation to draw that conclusion without first seeking more information and analysis, and to keep the long view in mind, which is why these articles serve an important purpose. The Overseas NGO Law does not mean the end of an independent civil society in China. It does mean another period of adaptation in which both foreign and Chinese NGOs will have to figure out how to operate in this new environment. Moreover, we should remember that the long view cuts both ways. It is not just about NGOs adapting, it is also about Chinese authorities adapting to the new law and finding a way to make it workable. As my article, and Professor Jia's, both point out, we need to remember that the law is part and parcel of a larger, ambitious, long-term project announced in the 4th Plenum in 2014 to build a socialist rule of law in China. This "rule of law" is not the rule of law that we know in liberal democracies; rather as various commentators note,[1] it is an instrument that Chinese leaders see as necessary if they want to reduce local government discretion, push through reforms and strengthen governance with the goal of maintaining sustainable growth and social stability. In other words, Chinese leaders will take the implementation of this law and other laws seriously because they see building a socialist rule of law as the path to a more prosperous, just and stable society.

To return to the challenges facing NGOs, my experience working with Chinese and foreign NGOs in China is that both are quite creative and persistent and as long as there are pressing social needs for their work, they will find ways to work through or around the NGO Law. When we hear of a foreign NGO closing its office, or a Chinese NGO partner declaring its withdrawal, we should not assume that is the end of the story. Or to put it another way, we should not, to paraphrase Mark Twain's words, greatly exaggerate their death.


[1] See Randall Peremboom, “Fly High the Banner of Socialist Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics: What Does the 4th Plenum Decision Mean for Legal Reforms in China?,” https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2519917, and Zachary Keck, “4th Plenum: Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics,” The Diplomat, October 20, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/4th-plenum-rule-of-law-with-chinese-characteristics/.

Friday, December 30, 2016

The Evolution and Intent of China's Overseas NGO Law


A more recent version of this article was published on ChinaFile, http://www.chinafile.com/viewpoint/origins-of-chinas-new-law-foreign-ngos.

Prologue

In March of 2013, Xi Jinping was named the President of the People’s Republic of China at the 12th National People’s Congress (NPC).  At the time, I was working for China Development Brief, an independent Chinese NGO started by the British journalist Nick Young in 1996.

I remember that month well because we were busy preparing for the launch of our directory of independent Chinese NGOs and a report on public advocacy in China. That event was a celebration of the substantial growth in independent civil society organizations over the last decade. It was also a coming out party for CDB which had assumed a low profile after Nick was denied entry back into China in 2007 for reasons that have never been made clear. Nick’s English-language website stopped posting content a short time afterwards. The Chinese CDB team continued to publish a Chinese-language quarterly covering civil society developments in China, but did not issue any new directories or special reports or organize major public events. The last NGO directory CDB had published was a directory of international NGOs in 2005, and before that a directory of Chinese NGOs in 2001.

To promote the new NGO directory and advocacy report, we held a day-long Civil Society Forum in the U.S. Embassy’s American Center. We invited over a hundred representatives from independent Chinese NGOs, foreign NGOs, diplomats, scholars and media, and asked several Chinese NGOs to speak about the significance of the directory and their advocacy experiences in China. 

We were anxious before and during the event because it was taking place 10 days after the close of the NPC session. Generally it’s not a good idea to organize large civil society gatherings in China, let alone in the capital one week after Xi’s coronation. Given the heightened security presence, we encountered difficulties and delays in the printing of the directory. One printing company pulled out when the police showed up unannounced at their office, so we approached a company located further outside Beijing that agreed to publish it. I remember the copies not showing up in our courtyard office until only a few days before our event.

Despite our fears, the Forum was a success. It was standing room only, we did not run out of food, the simultaneous interpreters performed admirably, and the police did not show up. Or if they did, they did not announce their presence.

That spring now seems like a distant memory, much like the week-long blue sky days that appeared over Beijing during the Olympics. Little did we know that two years later, the environment for civil society would change dramatically, that a number of the Chinese NGOs that attended the Forum would be subjected to harassment and detention and some would leave the country for safer havens, and that a draconian law placing foreign NGOs under police supervision would be passed.

Introduction

Since China opened its doors to the outside world in the late 1970s, thousands of overseas not-for-profit NGOs have carried out programs and activities in China, contributing to China’s development and engagement with the rest of the world. These NGOs run the gamut from trade and commercial groups like the U.S.-China Business Council and European Chamber of Commerce to universities like NYU and Stanford to foundations like Mercator and Ford to performing arts groups like the Philadelphia Symphony to think-tanks like Brookings and Carnegie to sporting associations like the International Olympic Committee and the NBA.

No one really knows how many of these organizations are operating in China, but the numbers are substantial. In 2005, China Development Brief (which also started as an overseas NGO) published the first directory of international NGOs in China listing around 200 selected NGOs. Since then, estimates ranging from 1,000 to 7,000 have been provided by Chinese and foreign scholars that include both overseas NGOs that have an office in China and those carrying out programs and activities in China from their overseas offices[i].   

For many years, the vast majority of these NGOs operated quietly in China in a grey area. Many are unregistered and work in China through local partners, while others are registered as a representative office of a company. That will all change with the passage in April of the Law on Administration of Activities of Overseas NGOs in the Mainland of China (hereafter Overseas NGO Law) which goes into effect on January 1, 2017. The Law is the first comprehensive regulation of its kind covering all overseas NGO activity in China.


The Long Road to Regulating Overseas NGOs

Prior to the Law, the Chinese government had taken halting, incremental steps to regulate foreign NGOs. The first came in April 1989 in the form of the Provisional Regulations for Foreign Chambers of Commerce that allowed chambers of commerce to register with the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT). Foreign NGOs that were not chambers of commerce had to wait another 15 years when the 2004 Foundation Management Regulation made its appearance. This regulation was issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA), the government agency responsible for regulating “social organizations” (China’s official term for NGOs), and was primarily intended to promote the development of Chinese foundations. Yet it included for the first time language on the registration of representative offices for “overseas foundations”[ii].  Overseas foundations and NGOs were allowed to register a representative office in China under a stringent “dual management system” in which an NGO first needed to get approval from a Professional Supervisory Union (PSU) in a similar field (essentially a government sponsor) before it could register with MCA.

The Foundation Regulation had a very limited impact on overseas NGOs: only a handful succeeded in registering primarily because most were unable to find a PSU. These fortunate few included operational NGOs like the World Wildlife Fund, China Medical Board and World Economic Forum and grant-making foundations like the Bill and Melinda Gates and Li Ka Shing Foundation. By 2015, the number of overseas NGOs that had registered a representative office numbered a mere 29 out of the hundreds of overseas NGOs with offices in China.

In early 2010, as part of a series of local policy experiments intended to improve the regulations of NGOs, the MCA launched a pilot program to register overseas NGOs in Yunnan.  The “Yunnan Province Provisional Regulations Standardizing the Activities of Overseas NGOs,” required overseas NGOs to “file documentation” (bei’an) about all their partners, funding and activities in Yunnan with the provincial Civil Affairs and Foreign Affairs departments. By December 2010, around 140 overseas NGOs had registered under this regulation and by 2013, MCA leaders were touting the Yunnan regulations as a model for national policy. This was also the year when Xi Jinping was anointed President of the PRC and the approach to regulating NGOs suddenly changed.

Xi Jinping’s New Governance Approach

Xi Jinping’s rise to power coincided with a new governance approach that focused on strengthening national security and “governing the country according to law” (yifa zhiguo) as ways to rejuvenate Communist Party rule. Already in the spring and summer of 2013, a major crackdown on activists, lawyers, bloggers and journalists was taking place to head off potential threats to social stability. By the end of 2013, a National Security Commission (NSC) headed by Xi Jinping was established. In early 2014, reports of overseas and Chinese NGOs working in Tibetan areas being closed down began to surface. In April of 2014, the NSC held its first meeting and a month afterwards ordered a national survey of overseas NGOs operating in China. 

During the 2014-16 period, a major anti-corruption drive launched by President Xi gathered momentum along with the repression against NGOs and human rights and labor activists and lawyers. Several foreigners who had been working for Chinese and overseas NGOs were evicted in 2015 for working on improper visas, and in January 2016 a Swedish citizen – Peter Dahlin – appeared on state-run television where he made a forced confession to working for an organization that supported Chinese human rights lawyers. These troubling developments were accompanied by the passage of several new security-oriented laws one after another in 2015 and 2016: the Counterterrorism Law, National Security Law, the Overseas NGO Law and most recently the Cybersecurity Law.

The Overseas NGO Law Surfaces

The first sign of the Overseas NGO Law came in December 2014 with the announcement that the NPC Standing Committee was deliberating the first draft of the law. That announcement caught many observers by surprise. Before this, MCA had been taking the lead on drafting regulations for overseas NGOs, using the Yunnan regulations as the basis for national regulations. In the case of the Overseas NGO Law, a draft of a national law was being proposed, not just a draft of a ministerial regulation like the one in Yunnan. More importantly, the announcement of the draft law was being made by the Vice-Minister of Public Security who stated that the registration and management authority for overseas NGOs would now be vested in the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), not the MCA. He noted that the regulation of overseas NGOs had been raised as an urgent issue at the Third Plenum in October 2013 and the Fourth Plenum in October 2014, and that the MPS had been working with the MCA and other departments as early as April 2014 on researching and drafting the law. The mention of April is significant because it coincides with the first meeting of the National Security Commission and suggests that the decision to make MPS responsible for regulating overseas NGOs was made at that meeting.

The Drafting and Substance of the Law

The first draft of the Overseas NGO Law was not made public, but an English translation quickly circulated. That draft was quite draconian. It gave overseas NGOs only two ways to operate legally in China. One was for the NGO to register a representative office, which required getting approval from a professional supervisory unit (PSU) working in the same field as the NGO, and then applying for registration with provincial Public Security departments. For NGOs that did not want to establish a representative office but only wanted to carry out projects and activities in China, the second option was to register for a “temporary activities” permit lasting one year.  Applying for a permit would also require jumping through a series of hoops, namely getting approval from a PSU, collaborating with a Chinese partner, and then applying for a permit from the relevant Public Security department. The draft law stated that overseas NGOs that did not follow one of these two channels would be operating illegally. 

There are a number of signs that point to a clear national security focus behind the drafting of this law. One was the transfer of registration and management authority from MCA to the MPS. Another was the MPS Vice Minster’s mention of April 2014, the same date as the first meeting of the National Security Commission, as the time when research and drafting on this law began. A third can be found in the language of the draft which has a stronger security emphasis than the Yunnan regulations.

At the same time, parts of the law are influenced by the Yunnan regulations developed by MCA[iii]. It uses the same term “overseas NGO” to refer to “…non-governmental, non-profit or public interest organizations that have been legally established overseas.” It preserves the “dual management” system which requires overseas NGOs to get approval from a PSU, although the PSU plays a somewhat different role in the Yunnan model. It also incorporates a similar “document filing” (bei’an) system for overseas NGOs to report on their activities, partners and funding.

We can also learn something about the law by examining its evolution from the first draft to the final version that was passed by the National People’s Congress in April of 2016. As is the norm, the law went through three drafts before its passage. The second draft, issued in early May of 2015, was the only one publicized to solicit comments from the public.

The revisions made in the later drafts reflect MPS recognition that certain provisions were going to be administratively burdensome, and changed them to streamline the process. The most significant example was the simplification of procedures for NGOs carrying out “temporary activities.” In the first and second drafts, NGOs would first need to get approval from a PSU, and find a Chinese partner to collaborate with. After that, it still needed to apply for a “temporary activities” permit from the relevant Public Security department and wait for their approval. After receiving public comments about the draft, the MPS dropped the requirements for PSU approval and Public Security approval for a permit in the final version of the law, and only required that NGOs work with their Chinese partner to “file documents” about their “temporary activity”. In other words, in the final version of the law, NGOs carrying out “temporary activities” only had to inform the relevant Public Security department about the activities but not wait for approval. 

In other instances, the MPS realized that certain procedures and requirements either overlapped with, or conflicted with, procedures and requirements in other laws and regulations. The first draft, for example, prohibited NGOs from having branch organizations but when it was discovered that some science and technology NGOs already had branch offices, the final version of the law allowed for branch offices “specified by the State Council.” Similarly, the first draft only allowed NGOs to register one representative office in China, but later drafts removed that limit although no language was inserted explicitly stating that NGOs could register more than one representative office.

The MPS also removed articles in the first and second drafts that allowed overseas NGOs to set up domestic NGOs, realizing that this could be used as a loophole giving overseas NGOs a channel for working covertly through these domestic NGOs. Given that domestic NGOs are regulated by MCA through a different set of laws and regulations, these articles would also have raised questions about which ministry would be responsible for supervising these domestic NGOs.

The amount of time it took to get from the first draft to the passage of the law is also telling. It took a total of nearly 16 months, 11 of which were spent digesting the many public comments made to the second draft and preparing a revised draft that was passed by the NPC Standing Committee in late April 2016. In comparison, the Counterrorism Law took 13 months, the National Security Law eight months, the Charity Law six months, and the Cybersecurity Law 15 months. The lengthy drafting process of the Overseas NGO Law was likely a product of several factors: the unfamiliarity of the MPS in regulating such a diverse set of organizations and the challenges it faced in processing the public comments; the need to coordinate with MCA and other relevant agencies on the revisions; concerns about the draft law raised by foreign NGOs, businesses and governments; and perhaps even infighting among agencies and groups with different views on the law.

The Law’s Intent and What NGOs Can Do

Two observations emerge from this examination of the Overseas NGO Law’s emergence and evolution. One is that Xi Jinping’s rise to power and his concerns about China’s security environment was the major driver behind the law’s establishment and timing. The second observation, drawing from the revisions made to the different drafts of the law and the length of time spent in the drafting, is that the law is being taken seriously by Chinese leaders as a governance tool to strengthen “law-based administration” (yifa xingzheng), recognize the role played by overseas NGOs in China’s development, and strengthen their regulation. In this sense, the law can be seen as part of Xi Jinping’s broader “governing the country according to law” (yifa zhiguo) campaign to improve Party discipline and governance over both the Chinese state and society. By strengthening regulation of a group of social actors associated with foreign values and agendas, the law is intended to provide legal channels for those actors to carry out their activities while also better protecting China from external threats. But another intent of the law, I would argue, is to require more transparency and accountability on the part of the implementing authorities, and the MPS in particular. By providing a detailed framework, procedures and responsibilities for regulating overseas NGOs, the law seeks to limit the discretionary power of the MPS even while it expands its administrative authority and resources.

I realize that this last point is not widely shared by many critics of the law who see the law giving the MPS unlimited power over overseas NGOs. While I am not a fan of this law, the critics’ view ignores the fact that Public Security organs and local governments already have the authority to close down many of the overseas NGO projects and offices in China that are unregistered or improperly registered. In 2000, the MCA issued the “Interim Regulations for Banning Illegal NGOs” that provided guidance to local authorities who were unclear about how to deal with unregistered or improperly registered Chinese and overseas NGOs working in their jurisdiction. As Deng Guosheng points out, local authorities were given wide discretion over how to implement this regulation which was much more ambiguous than the Overseas NGO Law[iv]. Over time, an unwritten understanding emerged among authorities to adopt a hands-off approach towards these “illegal” NGOs unless they posed a real threat to social stability or national security.

If the Chinese leadership really wanted to make life difficult for overseas NGOs, all they would need to do is issue a national directive or law to ensure that this regulation was enforced. But that would be like using a cudgel whose appearance would scare away many overseas NGOs. Instead the leadership chose to use a more surgical instrument by creating a law that required overseas NGOs to be transparent about their partners and funding, but also placed limits on the discretionary authority of Public Security and other government agencies. The intended effect, in my view, was not to drive NGOs from China but to corral them into officially-sanctioned areas and away from more sensitive areas working with grassroots NGOs working on rights protection, advocacy, religion, etc. To a large extent, this was also the effect of the Yunnan regulations[v].

Getting the intent of the law right is important because the MPS will be judged on its performance in implementing the law so that it does achieve its intended effect. If the intent of the law is truly to make life difficult for overseas NGOs and encourage them to leave the country, then the MPS has an easy job to do, and there is little that NGOs can do to shape implementation. But if the intent of the law is to ensure that overseas NGOs are able to work legally in officially-sanctioned areas, then the MPS has its work cut out for it and overseas NGOs have some leverage to shape the law’s implementation by monitoring and holding the MPS and other government agencies accountable for implementing and enforcing the law in an effective and impartial manner.


[i] Shawn Shieh and Signe Knutson, Special Report: the Roles and Challenges of International NGOs in China’s Development, China Development Brief (2012), http://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/publications/special-report-the-roles-and-challenges-of-international-ngos-in-chinas-development/.
[ii] http://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/REGULATIONS-FOR-THE-MANAGEMENT-OF-FOUNDATIONS-.pdf
[iii] Jennifer Hsu and Jessica Teets, “Is China’s New Overseas NGO Management Law Sounding the Death Knell for Civil Society? Maybe Not.” The Asia-Pacific Journal, vol. 14 (February 2016).
[iv] “The ‘Hidden Rules’ Governing China’s Unregistered NGOs: Management and Consequences,” The China Review, vol. 10 (Spring 2010).
[v] Hsu and Teets, “Is China’s New Overseas NGO Management Law Sounding the Death Knell for Civil Society? Maybe Not.”

Saturday, August 6, 2011

CDB (English)'s Inaugural Special Issue on Philanthropy and Civil Society

I am very pleased to announce our inaugural special issue on New Trends in Philanthropy and Civil Society in China is now available on our new website (www.chinadevelopmentbrief.cn).  (P.S. We are not the same as the old China Development Brief which is at www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com). 
Thanks to the fine work of our CDB translators, the 12 articles that make up this special issue have been appearing on our website for the last month.   Together, they provide a compelling and insightful glimpse into an important change taking place in China's nonprofit, philanthropic community.  For each article, I have written a brief introduction to provide context, and inserted explanatory notes through the text.  To provide coherence and context, I have also provided a Preface and Table of Contents for the special issue.
The Preface
·      tells how the special issue was produced;
·      provides a short primer on the nonprofit/philanthropic sector in the PRC;
·      summarizes the key findings of the 12 articles. 
It has been a busy summer for us at CDB(English).   In addition to getting our website up, and our special issue released, I have been traveling in the U.S. promoting CDB(English), and meeting with potential funders and partners.   I gave two public talks on our special issue at the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations in New York City, and the Kissinger Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C.  The title of the talk was “Same Bed, Different Dreams?: The New Philanthropy and Civil Society in China”.  Both talks were recorded and podcasts/videos are available on the websites of the Wilson Center and National Committee for those interested.
We hope you will take the time to explore the articles and other resources we provide on our website.   These resources include translations of Laws and Regulations governing the nonprofit sector, a Bibliography of sources on civil society, and Announcements of jobs, conferences, and activities of interest to an international audience. 
We will continue to provide translations of selected CDB articles, and develop the other NGO resources on our website.   We will be sending you monthly newsletters alerting you to new material on our website in addition to new CDB (English) developments and events.  If you know of others who wish to receive monthly CDB (English) newsletters, please have them email inquiries@chinadevelopmentbrief.cn.  If you do not wish to continue receiving newsletters, please reply to this email with the subject line “Unsubscribe” and we will take you off our mailing list.
CDB (English) would like to thank CDB, the Ford Foundation, and our CDB (English) translators and interns for their support.   As a translation project of CDB, CDB (English) would not be possible without the hard work of CDB staff who invest long hours to report on the nonprofit sector in China.   We also appreciate the financial support of the Ford Foundation who believed in us from the very start.  Finally, our translations and other resources would not be possible without the work of our CDB Translators, and interns: Emily Chesborough, Stephanie Roach, and Justin Pena. 

Wednesday, July 20, 2011

Talking about Chinese Philanthropy and Civil Society in the U.S.

I'm currently on home leave in the U.S., supposedly on vacation but at this point more work than vacation.  I figure now that I've left the Great Firewall I should use this opportunity to blog at least once, just to say I did it.   So this post is pure in the sense that it hasn't been filtered or laundered through a VPN or anonymous proxy.

While on home leave, I'm taking advantage of being on the east coast to promote the work I've been doing with China Development Brief, in particular our special issue on New Trends in Philanthropy and Civil Society that is appearing on our website at www.chinadevelopmentbrief.cn.  I just finished a talk at the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations today on that topic.  The talk was held at the Luce Foundation's conference room in their lovely 30th floor office with beautiful views of the city.  There was haze on the horizon which made me feel like I was in Beijing, right at home!

I couldn't imagine a better venue for my talk than the Luce Foundation.  Luce is one of the big names in philanthropy and they have a major Asia program to improve U.S. understanding of Asia.  There is also a China connection.  Henry Luce set up the foundation as a tribute to his parents who were missionaries and educators in China during the first half of the 20th century.  All four of the Luce children were born in China.  So to give a talk on philanthropy and civil society in China at the Luce headquarters seemed very fitting.

The talk went smoothly, aside from some initial technical problems with the computer.  I spoke about my work with China Development Brief (English), and spent some time discussing what constitutes the nonprofit/NGO/philanthropic sector in China before getting to the meat of the talk which was to lay out the major findings from the 12 articles we translated for our special issue on philanthropy and civil society.

For those interested, my discussion of the nonprofit sector and the major findings will be laid out in an introduction to the special issue that should be on our website soon.  Given the anxiety in the U.S. about the human rights situation in China, I expected more questions about the political situation for nonprofits in China, but there were none, though that may have had something to do with the limited time for Q&A.

In any case, the main purpose of my talk, beyond promoting CDB, was to send the message that there is a great deal of change going on in the nonprofit world in China despite the recent crackdowns on individual activists.

Next week I'll be giving a talk on the same topic next Tuesday, July 26 at the Kissinger Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C. 

After that, a week in San Diego and then back to Beijing where I may finally be able to take that vacation!

Sunday, March 27, 2011

The top 16 "public welfare" events of 2010

In a previous blog, I listed what I saw as some of “The Best and Worst of 2010 for China’s NGOs”.   In the their most recent issue (Winter 2010), China Development Brief came out with the top 16 major "public welfare" (gongyi) events.  The term “public welfare” is often used in China in place of nonprofit, civil society, or philanthropy. 

These top 16 events were selected from a survey of readers of three major media platforms that cover the “public welfare” or “civil society” sector in China: China Development Brief (with which I am working now), Social Entrepreneur magazine (published by the NGO, NonProfit Incubator or NPI) and NGOCN (NGOCN’s founder, Lu Fei, was profiled in an earlier post on this blog).   The list provides a window into what Chinese observers of the civil society sector think have been important trends.   Many, but not all, are events that I also listed in my Best and Worst List, which is a good thing because it suggests that I haven’t strayed too far from the perceptions of the Chinese NGO community.
The readers who responded to the survey were from all over China, including Hong Kong, and draw mainly from those working in the “public welfare” sector, but also include people working in government and business, students, and researchers.   Many are young, about 84% between 20-40 years of age, and about 42% are from Beijing and Guangdong. 
Here in order of the top vote getters are the 16 biggest “public welfare” events of 2010 with the percentage of votes in parentheses.  A number of these events were covered in my previous posts, including “The Best and Worst of 2010 for China’s NGOs” so I don’t go into them in detail.

1)  Jet Li revealing, in a September 2010 CCTV interview, problems he was having trying to register his One Foundation as a private foundation due to China’s restrictive registration laws, and rumors that the One Foundation might close (61%).
2)  The new regulations from the State Administration of Foreign Exchange that went into effect in March 2010 making it more difficult for grassroots NGOs to transfer foreign funds into their accounts (51%)
3)  The September visit by Bill Gates and Warren Buffet to discuss philanthropy with some of China’s wealthiest individuals (46%).
4)  The establishment in June of 2010 of the Public Welfare (or Philanthropy) Research Institute at Beijing Normal University.  The Institute is funded by the One Foundation and headed by a former Ministry of Civil Affairs official, Wang Zhenyao (45%).
5)  The announcement by the Ministry of Civil Affairs in July of 2010 requiring 15 national public fundraising foundations to turn the funds they had raised for the Yushu (Qinghai province) earthquake relief over to the Qinghai provincial government, provincial Red Cross and provincial Charity Federation.  This decision was criticized for harming the cause of philanthropy in China (43%).
6)  The participation of almost 60 Chinese NGOs in the UN climate change talks in Tianjin in October of 2010.  The NGOs issued a joint statement, and organized 20 joint activities.  It was the largest number of Chinese NGOs to participate in the area of climate change (40%).
7)   The slowness of the NGO response to the drought in the southwestern part of China  in the spring of 2010 provoked some discussion in the media, especially compared to the quick NGO response to the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake (35%).
8)  The establishment of the China Foundation Center in July of 2010 (33%).
9) The Green Choice Alliance, a group of 34 grassroots NGOs, among them Friends of Nature, Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs and Green Beagle, released two investigative reports in April and June on heavy metal pollution from the information and technology sector (32%). 
10)  The Qinghai Gesanghua Educational Assistance Association raised more than 2.59 million yuan online for the Yushu earthquake highlighting the use of new media platforms for NGOs to fundraise and carry out relief work (32%).
11)  The Yunnan provincial government piloting new regulations governing international NGO management.  The regulations came out in December of 2009 and were implemented in January of 2010.  These are the first regulations explicitly aimed at international NGOs (31%).
12)   The first New Public Welfare Carnival held in Shanghai in August and September of 2010, an event that brought together businesses, government, academics and NGOs to promote social innovation (30%).
13)  The notice by Beijing University cutting its association with the Peking University Women’s Legal Aid Center in March of 2010 (30%)
14)  Strikes by workers at Honda Motor Company’s factories in Guangdong starting in May of 2010 (30%).
15)  Cao Dewang, chairman of the Fuyao Group, gave the largest one-time donation in the history of the PRC to the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation to help poor farmers in the five drought-stricken provinces in southwest China (28%).
16)  The folding of “Friends” publication which was aimed at the gay, HIV/AIDS and public health community and had been publishing since 1998.  “Friends” closed because it lost its major source of funding from an international foundation (21%). 

Thursday, March 17, 2011

It's been a while...

I realize it’s been some time since I’ve posted and wanted to explain my long absence from these pages.  One reason (ok, excuse) is that I’ve been busy getting the China Development Brief translation project going.  One part of this project is to bring together a community of volunteer translators who can help in translating selected CDB articles for a special report we are putting together on Philanthropy and Civil Society in China.  I’m pleased to say that the response has been wonderful.  So far, 34 people have signed up to translate the articles from Chinese to English.  They are a diverse group, students, scholars, NGO practitioners, and professionals, all with advance bilingual skills.  I’m also working on the website which will be linked to the Chinese-language CDB website, www.chinadevelopmentbrief.cn.  I hope to have the entire special report ready by June of this year.

My other excuse is the internet in Beijing which has been acting up as a result – I’m just guessing here, but I think it’s a pretty good guess – of the uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East, and the call for a similar uprising here in China, using the internet and various social media sites as a springboard.  The authorities here are understandably on edge and have made it very difficult to access internet sites outside of China.  Gmail is very, very sporadic now, and my VPN provider which I thought would never be blocked was.  As a result, I’ve not been able to access my blog until today.

I promise to put more blog postings up soon.  My next one will be a blog about how to read this blog.

Thursday, January 27, 2011

Good news for 2011: Starting up China Development Brief (English)

January 27, 2011

I’m pleased to announce that we’ll be starting up China Development Brief (English) this year.  The mission of CDB (English) is to improve understanding and cooperation between the international community and China’s growing nonprofit and philanthropic community by providing authoritative and timely English-language coverage of China’s civil society sector.
To achieve this goal, CDB (English) is partnering with the Beijing Civil Society Development Research Centre which publishes the Chinese-language CDB and maintains a website, www.chinadevelopmentbrief.cn.   The content for CDB (English) will come from translated reports from CDB, the Chinese media, and Chinese academics, as well as translations of government laws and regulations governing the civil society sector.
After that rather long-winded announcement, a bit of explanation is in order here.  In my first post for this blog, written in October of 2009,  I mentioned that I'd been thinking of starting up the English-language China Development Brief (CDB) that was closed down in 2007, but found the environment was not quite right and decided to start writing this blog instead.  For those who are not familiar with CDB, it had been providing some of the most authoritative and timely English-language coverage of development and civil society issues in China over the previous decade.  Since its closure in 2007, the civil society sector in China has been undergoing substantial and complex changes, some of which I've discussed in this blog, yet there has been little English-language coverage aside from occasional media reports, and certainly no informed and sustained coverage.  The Chinese-language CDB, which is a spin-off of the English-language CDB, has however continued to operate and provide quality, detailed coverage on the civil society sector in China.
A few months ago, I decided to give it another go by approaching the Chinese-language CDB about starting up an English-language service.  Not knowing what to expect, I was a bit surprised to find my proposal welcomed enthusiastically by the CDB staff. 
In the coming months, we will be applying for funding and working on developing a website, a pilot newsletter and a special issue on New Trends in Philanthropy and Civil Society in China.  I’m looking to use a “crowd-sourcing” model that relies on communities of volunteer translators to translate the content for the website, newsletter and special issue.  More on that later. 
I’m excited about working with CDB on this project and hope it lays the foundation for high-quality, timely, authoritative yet accessible coverage of China’s civil society sector.  I’m convinced that the time is now ripe to start this project.  Civil society in China has encountered some setbacks, but most informed observers that I know, myself included, have been impressed by the gains made by civil society organizations over the past two years, and we are hoping that those gains build momentum over the next few years.  Whatever the trends maybe, CDB (English) plans to be around to cover them.
With wishes for a Happy Year of the Rabbit,
Shawn Shieh, Founding Editor, China Development Brief (English)

Thursday, July 22, 2010

Discussing the future of China’s NGOs

July 23, 2010


My second day back in Beijing, I’m riding my bike out to the China Development Brief (CDB) office which is nestled in a courtyard amid the hutongs northeast of Jingshan Park. Here's a picture of me in front of the CDB courtyard door.


There’s a meeting that morning among some NGOs to propose ideas for how they can integrate climate change into their poverty alleviation programs. The meeting is organized by Oxfam Hong Kong which is working closely with the State Council’s Poverty Alleviation Office on various projects around China, and attended by some well known NGOs such as Friends of Nature, Global Environment Institute, Green Earth, Action Aid, and China Dialogue.

I asked the Oxfam people about the incident with the Ministry of Education's notice warning universities not to let their student volunteers work with Oxfam.  One Oxfam person said that project was stopped, but otherwise said Oxfam hasn't been affected and is still going strong with their many projects in China.

After the meeting and lunch, I chatted with Fu Tao, who has been the Chinese editor of the CDB since it’s inception, and knows the Chinese NGO sector well. We started talking about the recent measures that make it difficult for foreign donations to get to Chinese NGOs. Fu Tao felt that this was a clever measure by the government to make life difficult for NGOs, particularly those registered as businesses by cutting their pipeline to foreign funds.

When he asked me for my take on the situation. I told him I thought these measures could be seen as part of an effort by different government departments to better regulate and control a growing NGO sector, and not necessarily a coordinated attempt to repress the entire sector. Fu didn’t seem convinced. He said there were cases where the crackdowns on NGOs did represent a coordinated effort, even if they appeared to be driven by one department. He noted the case of Gongmeng which tax authorities investigated and closed down for failure to pay taxes on funds from foreign donors. I agreed that Gongmeng was an example of the government’s coordinated response because several different government departments showed up at the same time to close Gongmeng down, but said not every case is like that.

The more we talked, the more Fu Tao seemed to be of two minds about the future of NGOs in China. He was concerned about the recent measures, including new regulations on foreign NGOs in Yunnan, but then admitted that the NGO sector was expanding in other ways. He noted that some grassroots NGOs that were previously registered as businesses, such as Facilitator (xie zuoze) and Shining Stone (canyu shi), were able to get registered as NGOs with Civil Affairs. He believes this is because the government is willing to encourage NGOs that provide services but don’t engage in more sensitive advocacy work as Gongmeng and Yirenping had. He also noted the rise of private foundations, and thought this was a significant trend in China because some of these foundations (Nandu, Youcheng, Vantone) were following a new philanthropy model supporting grassroots NGOs, rather than the old philanthropy of supporting government and GONGOs. What you are seeing are private entrepreneurs with a different set of values and priorities.

Before we parted ways, I asked him if he was pessimistic about the future of the NGO sector. I thought he was going to say yes, but then said he really wasn’t sure.

Thursday, October 1, 2009

Inaugural post

October 1, 2009

This is the first posting on my new blog, NGOs in China. I chose to post it on the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PRC for reasons that I think will become clear as the blog evolves. I hope you find the blog useful. If not, let me know why.

I’ve been thinking about starting this blog since last year when I was editing a book on Chinese NGOs with Jonathan Schwartz, a colleague of mine who teaches at SUNY New Paltz. Editing that book with Jonathan opened my eyes to the richness and diversity of grassroots NGOs in China. I have to confess that I came to the NGO scene only recently, after forays into local governance, and corruption in China. But I thought I understood China’s political landscape pretty well, until I started editing this book, and then it became apparent how little I did know about the NGO scene and how quickly it’s developed over the last few years. My thanks to the other contributors to that volume who helped me better understand the Chinese NGO sector: Tim Hildebrandt, Catherine Keyser, Joan Kaufman, Andre Laliberte, Marsha Smith, Jennifer Turner, and Hong Zhang.

In editing the book, I found that grassroots NGOs have been sprouting up all around the country, despite the authoritarian political system, an unclear and unwelcoming regulatory environment, and a state-dominated, profit-obsessed society that is only beginning to understand what NGOs, nonprofits and philanthropic foundations are. These NGOs or proto-NGOs take all sorts of forms that often bear little resemblance to NGOs and nonprofits in industrial democracies. But they are engaged in addressing a wide range of social problems, using visions, ideas and approaches that are refreshingly different from the government’s to carry out social, legal, political and ideological change from the bottom up.

I became so fascinated by NGOs that I decided to start another book project, this time one focused on the NGO activists themselves, their background, what influenced them to go into NGO work, and their strategies and ideas for expanding their influence, and carrying out social and political change in an authoritarian system.

In January of 2009, I took a trip to Yunnan and Sichuan to interview NGOs there, including NGOs that had responded to the earthquake that hit western Sichuan in May of 2008. My interviews with NGO leaders there, hearing about their projects, their ideas, their ambitions and their failures, convinced me that I needed to do more to tell the story of grassroots NGOs to an English-speaking audience. Since then, I have been back to Sichuan in June of 2009 to follow up on what NGOs were doing in the earthquake reconstruction, and interviewing NGO founders here in Beijing.

So the main reason for starting this blog is to record and thereby recognize some of the diversity and scope of the NGO community here, and communicate it to an English-speaking audience. I realize that is a tall order, and can’t promise much. The NGO community in China is too large for one person to do justice to in a blog. It will be a record of my own discussions with, and readings of, NGO activists, academics, and others who inhabit and contribute to the development of the nonprofit, nongovernmental, charitable sector here in China. Whenever possible, I will be asking people to write a guest column for this blog.

I have no ambitions of filling the large void left by China Development Brief (CDB), an NGO started by Nick Young. CDB did a great job of informing both Chinese and English speakers about Chinese NGOs and civil society, as well as many other aspects of social development. Unfortunately, it was closed down (although the Chinese counterpart still works out of the same office space) and Nick was ordered to leave the country in August of that year. The closing down of CDB meant the loss of an important source of English-language information about the China NGO scene, and got me thinking of ways to revive CDB in another form, or failing that, starting a blog that would keep English-language readers informed about NGO developments in China. As I found out, trying to revive CDB proved too sensitive, and so a blog became the next best option.