Orphanages, Homeless Shelters and the NGO Space in China

I'm reposting a new China Development Brief feature, written by CDB(English)'s Associate Directory, Amanda Brown-Inz, which looks at major Chinese media stories having to do with the civil society space in China.

 

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As a supplement to CDB's Weekly Civil Society News feature, we are launching View from the Media, a weekly column which will summarize and provide analysis of some of the major stories concerning civil society that appear in the Chinese media.

This week, we begin with two cases that sparked widespread controversy in the field: the Lankao Fire Incident and the "Two Freezing to Death" Incident. Both cases draw attention to concerns about government handling of social welfare programming, and to anxieties about the navigation of spaces outside of government administration.

 

I

 

The Lankao Fire Incident refers to a fire that occurred in Lankao County, Henan, on January 4. It was discovered that 7 orphans, who were living under the care of a woman named Yuan Lihai, perished in the fire. Further investigation revealed that Yuan Lihai ran an unofficial, unregistered orphanage that was nonetheless utilized by local authorities in the county, which lacked an official welfare facility for orphans or abandoned children. According to reports, although both the public and the authorities were aware of substandard living conditions in the orphanage and felt that it was "only a matter of time" before this sort of tragedy would befall Yuan Lihai, the orphanage operated for more than 20 years and received financial and material support from the county government.

 

The spark of media coverage following the fire brought national attention to this incident, and also brought to light a number of similar shortfalls around the country. According to one article, after news of the Lankao affairs prompted the Guangdong provincial government to investigate the quality of public facilities for orphans and abandoned children, an official in Guangdong, whose county had speciously claimed to operate a state-mandated orphanage, sought to "borrow" orphans from a local temple. Of the 2,853 counties in China, the Ministry of Civil Affairs found that only 64 possessed child welfare facilities. The childcare centers in Aid Stations (救助站), present in a number of counties including Lankao, were deemed unsatisfactory even by local officials (for reasons elucidated in the following section).

 

While it is unclear precisely what sort of response will unfold in the wake of the incident, the Lankao fire raised a number of issues that will affect both local governments and non-governmental service providers. The lack of proper state welfare facilities for orphans and abandoned children has drawn widespread criticism, leading the Ministry of Civil Affairs to pledge assistance in the creation of 500 counties by 2015. As for the private orphanages caring for more than 80 percent of the country's 615,000 reported orphans, it is inclear whether the incident will lead local Civil Affairs Bureaus to develop official relationships with these facilities through procurement of services as hoped by some, or whether government efforts will focus on eradicating the operation of illegal orphanages. 

 

II

 

The second case receiving widepread media attention this week was the case of two homeless men in Changsha, Hunan who froze to death after repeatedly refusing to go to Aid Stations for care. While the initial response from officials seems to have been that the state should not be held liable for the deaths of these men, who chose not to seek help, the case was further complicated by later reports of an undercover journalist who was beaten by Aid Station employees. The employees claimed that they suspected he was mentally ill and perhaps carrying a weapon, and explained that they were trying to restrain him. As a former MCA official stated, however, such a response would be inappropriate regardless of the suspect's mental state.

 

The official, Tang Jun, explained in an interview that many of the issues with Aid Stations stem from their previous incarnations as part of the Shelter and Repatriation System (收容遣返制度), which was developed to deal with errant migrant workers in a time when workers were just beginning to leave their homes en masse to seek employment in other provinces. Criticism of the Shelter and Repatriation System led to its disbanding in 2003, when the stations were converted into Aid Stations. Unfortunately, Tang explained, many of the staff have retained their violent habits, and the stations often continue to serve their original purpose of shipping migrants home rather than offering them shelter.

 

The responses to this case seem to be two-fold, and may cause both positive and negative repercussions. On one hand, the Ministry of Civil Affairs has made efforts to educate Aid Station personnel as to the proper protocol in dealing with these types of situations, so as to make the Aid Stations more hospitable to the homeless. On the other hand, the vows of preventing this sort occurrence may lead to further strong-arming of the homeless into Aid Station facilities, as homeless deaths are felt to reflect poorly on the state. Finally, on the transparency front, a Changsha lawyer has requested that the Aid Station release its financial information, demonstrating a desire among the public to "keep watch" on the stations' activities.

 

These cases highlight the complex navigation of social welfare provision in the 21^st century, as the public becomes increasingly vocal about expectations that the government will provide adequate social services. In some cases, the government may accept direct responsibility for the operation of these services, but the discussion of "social management innovation" in the 16^th – 18^th Congress reports indicates that the government will begin to rely on the procurement of social services from social organizations. Regardless of which route the government chooses, the focus on social welfare will have significant repercussions for the numerous non-government organizations who currently fill these roles, and for the groups they serve. Non-government service provision organizations will likely receive more supervision from government agencies or face serious restrictions of the scope of their work, and disadvantaged groups will find that their welfare is of greater concern to local government officials. 

 

By Amanda Brown-Inz,

Associate Director, China Development Brief (English)

A New Dawn For Civil Society After the 18th Party Congress?

I'm reposting a Policy Brief I posted on China Development Brief more than a month ago. In two more weeks, the National People's Congress will be held here in Beijing and Xi Jinping, the new General Secretary of the Communist Party will be anointed as the next President of the People's Republic of China.

POLICY BRIEF NO. 12 (December 2012): A New Dawn After the 18^th Party Congress?

After the 18^th Party Congress, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, who have been anointed to become the new president and premier respectively (they will assume these positions after the next National People’s Congress in March of 2013) made a number of public appearances that gave observers some optimism that the new leadership will be supportive of reforms strengthening China’s civil society, but we will have to wait and see if they follow up with actions, and not just words.

Xi made a trip to the more freewheeling southern province of Guangdong to promote the reforms being carried out there. He also spoke on the 30^th anniversary of the 1982 revision to the Constitution, calling for officials to do more to protect citizen rights, including human rights, and promote public confidence in the law. "We must firmly establish, throughout society, the authority of the Constitution and the law and allow the overwhelming masses to fully believe in the law," he said. In a separate meeting with HIV/AIDS activists, Li Keqiang called for the government to provide more support, specifically in terms of registration and funding, to grassroots NGOs engaged in combating HIV/AIDS.

Two other developments caught the media’s eye this month that deserve our attention. One is the government’s effort to build a foundation for government contracting to NGOs, and the other is an effort at the local level to create a “hub” system to better support and manage NGOs. The first effort is important because it heralds a new era of state-NGO collaboration, albeit on the state’s terms, and offers cash-strapped NGOs a new source of funding. The second is significant because it represents an effort by the local party-state to bring NGOs under their big tent.

Government contracting to NGOs will receive a big boost with the historic decision by the central government to set up a RMB 200 million (USD 32 million) fund in 2013 to purchase social services from social organizations. In line with this announcement, the Ministry of Civil Affairs has issued a “2013 Project Implementation Plan for the Government Financial Support of Social Organizations' Participation in Social Services”, and the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the Ministry of Finance have jointly issued a set of guidelines about how this fund will be used.

In the other development, the Guangdong provincial government, following in the footsteps of an earlier experiment in Beijing, is putting in place a “hub” system that will use “people’s organizations” such as the Communist Youth League and Women’s Federation, which enjoy close ties to the party-state, as a vehicle for supporting and managing NGOs.

Can the Chinese Government Both Support and Micromanage NGOs?

Here's one of the Policy Briefs I wrote for China Development Brief in November. It's about whether the Chinese government can have it both ways. It want to support the development of NGOs, but at the same time, closely manage and supervise that developmental process. But doesn't the latter ultimately subvert the former? Here's what I said:

In the run-up to the 18^th Party Congress which opened November 8 and ended November 15 with the announcement of China’s new leadership core, the news falls into two categories of policy trends that we have been seeing over this past year.

The first of these trends involves policies that are more supportive of social organizations, the official term in China for nonprofits or NGOs.  These policies come in different forms.  One is the continuation of reforms at the local level to make registration easier for social organizations. This month, much of the news has been about reforms in the wealthy eastern province of Zhejiang, such as the cities of Ningbo and Wenzhou. Another policy involves local governments, in places like Guangdong and Sichuan, setting up special funds to support and incubate social organizations and contract services to social organizations. More localities are financing these special funds using public welfare lottery money.  Some environmental NGOs, however, have found that the funds used for purchasing services from social organizations are not sufficient to carry out their projects.
The second trend involves policies seeking to better regulate and manage the social organization sector. We have seen some of these policies and guidelines come out over the last few months. This month, we hear about other methods the government is using to standardize the sector. Both the Ministry of Civil Affairs and local Civil Affairs bureaus are providing ratings to registered social organizations, although it is not clear what goes into creating these ratings. With a 3A-level rating or above from the Ministry, a social organization may receive awards, and is given priority for government contracting. With a 4A-level rating or above, an organization can undergo a simplified process for its yearly inspection.  An organization’s rating is good for a three-year period and is based on a 1000 point rating system.

Ratings may not be a bad idea if done correctly, but another method that has been making the news is the Party’s efforts to become involved in managing social organizations. We touched on this in our last Policy Brief where we discussed the role of the Social Affairs Committee which is a newly formed agency under the local Party Committee responsible for social affairs which includes the development of social organizations. This month, we continue to hear more news about efforts to establish Party branches and groups within social organizations. This trend would mean both the government and Party would be involved in supervising social organizations.

It is not clear how the government and Party would coordinate their specific roles and responsibilities, but the involvement of both Party and government bureaucracies in managing social organizations is not a good sign. It runs counter to the first trend of supporting social organizations and making it easier for them to operate. Perhaps the Party and government see their efforts to manage social organizations as a good faith, paternalistic gesture to provide guidance and support. But they could also be interpreted as micromanagement, and an attempt to exercise stricter supervision over social organizations. As one article in the People’s Daily, the Communist Party’s mouthpiece, makes clear, “loosening restrictions” over social organizations does not mean authorities should “become lax or complacent”.

Micromanagement not withstanding, some observers have been optimistic about the future for social organizations after the 18^th Party Congress.  Professor Wang Ming, director of Tsinghua University’s NGO Research Center and one of the leading authorities on China’s NGOs, is bullish on the future for social organizations, noting that the 18^th Party Congress continued the same strong support for social organizations expressed at the 17^th Party Congress in 2007.

China Development Brief's December Newsletter -- New "Weekly Civil Society News" Feature

I'm reposting here China Development Brief (English)'s December Newsletter.  CDB (English) is the place to go for information and resources about China's nonprofit, NGO, philanthropic space.  Check our stuff out!

Highlight: New "Weekly Civil Society News" Feature

In order to help our readers keep up with the rapidly-changing landscape of Chinese civil society, CDB has developed a new weekly feature which compiles some of the most interesting and groundbreaking Chinese and English-language news articles concerning Chinese NGOs, with an emphasis on government policy. Here is the most recent Weekly Civil Society News, and please check our homepage on Fridays for weekly updates!

Policy Briefs

 

Policy Brief No. 9 (October 2012): Meet Your Local Social Affairs Committee

Policy Brief No. 10 (November 2012): The 18th Party Congress and China's Civil Society

Policy Brief No. 11 (November 2012): Supporting and Micromanaging NGOs?

Special Report

 

Special Report: The Roles and Challenges of International NGOs in China’s Development (Free PDF Report Now Available)

Featured Articles

 

Bringing “Pro Bono” to Beijing: A Case Study in Localizing International Practices

Between Heaven and Hell: Grassroots NGOs in Central China
Introduction: As part of CDB’s series on NGOs in Anhui, this article chronicles the struggles and slow progress of public service NGOs working in China’s central region of Henan, Shanxi, Anhui, Hebei and Hubei.

Laos’ Ban Chim Village: The First Partnership Between a Chinese NGO and a Chinese Company Overseas

Yang Guang: From MSM Trailblazer to Marching in Place
Introduction: As part of her series on NGOs in Anhui, CDB Senior Staff Writer, Guo Ting, provides a moving account of an MSM (Men who have Sex with Men) worker’s 14 year effort to provide a space for gay men in Fuyang, Anhui to get counseling and HIV testing.

Ma Zhengzhou: An AIDS Relief Practitioner on the Frontlines

The Culture of China’s Environmental Movement
Introduction: A group of young environmentalists offer a critical examination of what they see as the shortcomings of the current environmental movement in China.

Reflecting on “Activism” in China’s Environmental Movement
Introduction: A group of young environmentalists argue that more strategic thinking and reflection, and less of an “action first” mentality, is needed if China’s environmental movement is going to succeed.

Roundtable on the Impact of Recent Policy Changes on China’s NGOs
Introduction: In May of this year, CDB invited a diverse group of NGOs to share their views regarding recent policy reforms in the NGO sector at both the national and local levels.  What they had to say should be read by everyone who is concerned about the impact these reforms will have on China’s nascent civil society….

Yang Yunbiao’s Brainchild: A Rural Cooperative in Anhui
Introduction: CDB Senior Staff Writer, Guo Ting, delves into the fascinating world of rural cooperatives in this profile of an Anhui cooperative founded by Yang Yunbiao, a former rural rights-defense (weiquan) activist…..

The 512 Voluntary Relief Services Center Opens Its Chuandao Academy
Introduction: CDB Researcher, Fu Tao, profiles the Chuandao Academy which was set up by the Chengdu-based 512 Voluntary Relief Services Center to promote exchange and learning among grassroots NGOs….

Forthcoming Articles

In the next month, we will have articles appearing on gender and feminism, a "voluntourism" NGO, and an oral history of Xu Bai, founder of Golden Key, an organization that promotes education for blind children.

Make a Donation to CDB

  We are exploring ways of creating fee-based subscriptions to some of CDB(English)’s resources, but in the meantime, we ask that you consider making a small donation if you find our articles and other resources useful.

Thanks to Give2Asia, U.S.-based individuals and organizations can easily make tax-deductible donations to CDB by going to our Give2Asia fund page at www.give2asia.org/cdb.  Once your donation is made, Give2Asia will send you a letter and receipt confirming your donation.

What Does the 18th Party Congress Augur for the Future of China's Civil Society?

The 18^th Party Congress has wrapped up and we now know the number and composition of the next Politburo Standing Committee which make up China's new leadership core.  It consists of seven men – Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Zhang Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Liu Yunshan, Wang Qishan and Zhang Gaoli in order of their rank on the Committee.  According to most observers, this leadership group is stacked with conservatives and supporters of the past president, Jiang Zemin. In China’s political spectrum, the difference between reformers and conservatives is not as wide as it used to be (think Deng Xiaoping vs. Hua Guofeng, or Hu Yaobang vs. Chen Yun), so I’m not sure how meaningful it is to say that the new leadership is on the conservative side.  To me, they represent different shades of grey.  Ultimately, their core interest regardless of their liberal or conservative leaning is to strengthen the Communist party and its governance of China.  Here I use the term “governance” to denote a process of government working through horizontal partnerships with other stakeholders in society.  “Rule”, in contrast, implies a process of strengthening the vertical, bureaucratic lines of authority. 

As I explain below, the old and new leadership now recognize that the Communist Party will only survive into the 21^st century if it “governs.”  For the party-state, this line of thinking means reaching out not only to the business elite (a process that started with Jiang Zeming’s Three Represents in the 1990s) but also to NGOs and other social actors.  We saw this outreach in the 16^th Party Congress in 2003 when Hu Jintao recognized the need to strengthen the party’s horizontal linkages with society, and create institutional channels for the orderly participation of society in resolving China’s social contradictions. 

This recognition is reflected in party jargon such as “social management”, “social management innovation” and “social construction”.  These terms received more attention in the 17^th Party Congress in 2007 in which Hu’s speech actually mentioned a role for “social organizations,” the official Chinese term for NGOs or nonprofits.  Over the last few years, top leaders have spoken on numerous occasions about “social management innovation” and “social construction”, spawning a cottage industry of “innovation” at the national and local levels (See the article by China Development Brief editor, Liu Haiying, “How the Official Discourse of ‘Social Management Innovation’ Has Expanded the Space for NGOs”.).  In the 12^th Five Year Plan (2011-2015), an entire section (Party IX) was set aside for the first time ever to discuss social management innovations such as promoting social organizations and community governance, and expanding the space for public participation to improve public services and policies.  There has also been a big push for government contracting to NGOs.  Last year, the central government announced it would set aside a 200 million RMB fund to purchase social services from NGOs.  At the local level, a number of localities have been designated to carry out pilots in different aspects of social management innovation.

This news about social management innovation or social reform may come as a surprise to those who have been watching the 18^th Party Congress proceedings.  Much has been written about political and economic reform, or the lack thereof, in the run-up to the leadership turnover.  But as Qian Gang noted in an insightful article (“Society Lost”) posted to the China Media Project’s website, social reform got lost in the mix, getting subsumed under the broad rubric of political reform.  Significant political reforms may not be in the offing any time soon, especially with this Standing Committee, but the “social management innovation” initiatives discussed above show that social reform is on the agenda and in the pipeline and will not be easily dislodged.  That is because there appears to be a pretty broad consensus among the leadership that the party-state needs to strengthen its governance capacity, and one way to do that is by carrying out social reforms.  That is good news for those of us who work in and study the NGO or nonprofit sector.

The bad news is that social reforms will be carried out gradually and on the party-state’s terms.  The slogan used to preface the discussion of social management innovation in the 12^th Five Year Plan is “the party leads, government takes the responsibility, society coordinates, and the public participates” (党委领导、政府负责、社会协同、公众参与).  Under this principle, GONGOs with close ties to the government will play a primary role with grassroots NGOs bringing up the rear, social service organizations will be encouraged over advocacy organizations, and there will be yet another effort to establish party groups within NGOs.

Still, even within these constraints, the various social reform initiatives that will be carried out over the next five years should provide space for civil society proponents to push for more liberalization. There now exists a debate over how to promote social management innovation. Conservatives emphasize strengthening the state’s vertical management functions, partnering with GONGOs and strengthening the party’s grassroots organization.  Liberals want to play up the state’s horizontal coordination functions and strengthen the role of NGOs and public participation.  NGOs and their supporters will need to work diligently to push this debate in a more liberal direction. 

There remains a great deal to be done to improve the legal, regulatory and ideological environment for NGO and public participation. NGO and other civil society activists will need to forge strategic alliances with other stakeholders in the government, business sector, media and academia. They will need to call attention to the various ways in which the current system discriminates against grassroots NGOs and activists and privileges GONGOs and others inside the system.  And they will need to advocate for further changes in the legal and regulatory system to make it easier for grassroots NGOs to register, fundraise, gain tax exemptions, and monitor and influence policy. 

China’s civil society has come a long way under Hu Jintao’s administration, though due more to their own efforts than to any reforms Hu and Wen put through.  Now they face a similar situation with this new leadership core. Rather than wait for China’s leaders to move in a liberal direction, they will again have to take the initiative to preserve and build on their hard-earned gains.

 

 

China Development Brief's October Newsletter: Launching Our New Civil Society Learning Space

 Here's our October Newsletter announcing China Development Brief's new Civil Society Learning Space.  For those bringing groups through Beijing who want to learn more about what is going on in the civil society sector, or would like to arrange visits with Beijing-based NGOs, we've set up the Learning Space to provide talks and other services.  Take a look at our brochure on our website.

Highlight: New CDB Civil Society Learning Space

China Development Brief is pleased to announce the launch of our Civil Society Learning Space! The Learning Space will allow students and other groups to visit our Dongcheng office to learn about CDB's history and topics related to China's civil society and social development. Please contact Amanda Brown-Inz at amandabrown@chinadevelopmentbrief.cn for more information about sessions and program fees.

Policy Brief

Policy Brief No. 8 (August/September 2012): Chinese Grassroots NGOs Have a Long Way To Go

Editorials

Editorial: Animal Welfare and the Dignity of the Chinese People
CDB's editors see in the debate over animal welfare hope for reconsidering long-held cultural beliefs rooted in anthropocentrism and utilitarianism.

Feature Articles

Environmental NGOs Join Forces to Influence Legislation
CDB Senior Staff Writer Guo Ting reports on environmental NGOs partnering with mainstream players such as political and business elites, academics, and media to craft and submit legislative proposals.

Chinese NGOs Travel to Myanmar
Yu Xiaogang, one of China's best-known environmentalists and founder of the Yunnan NGO Green Watershed, writes about the environmental and social impact of China's rapidly growing investment in Myanmar.  

"Blood and Sweat" for the Public Interest
CDB Editor Liu Haiying highlights a growing recognition in the NGO sector that public service, nonprofit work is not simply about pursuing one's passion and ideals. As the public service sector matures in China, it has become a way for many to make a living and pursue a career.

Voices: The Best of NGO Publications

Changes in the Global Fund: The Challenges Facing China's AIDS NGOs and How They Should Respond

Forthcoming Articles

In the next month, we will have articles appearing on the future of China's environmental movement, NGOs in Anhui, Chinese NGOs in Laos, and more...

 

Make a Donation to CDB

We are exploring ways of creating fee-based subscriptions to some of CDB(English)’s resources, but in the meantime, we ask that you consider making a small donation if you find our articles and other resources useful.

Thanks to Give2Asia, U.S.-based individuals and organizations can easily make tax-deductible donations to CDB by going to our Give2Asia fund page at www.give2asia.org/cdb.  Once your donation is made, Give2Asia will send you a letter and receipt confirming your donation.

 

Spread the Word!

If you know of others who wish to receive monthly CDB (English) newsletter, please have them visit our sign-up page (if the link does not work simply send an e-mail to inquires@chinadevelopmentbrief.cn).  If you do not wish to continue receiving newsletters, please reply to this email with the subject line “Unsubscribe” and we will take you off our mailing list.

We wish to thank the Henry Luce Foundation, Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst, the U.S. Embassy,
the Ford Foundation, and the Little Gold Book for their generous financial support.

The Power of the Mob vs. the Power of NGOs

There are moments when I have reservations about grassroots NGOs in China.  They are committed and passionate about helping society, and many work with integrity to achieve their goals in spite of working under difficult circumstances.  But they are also small, receive little recognition from the government or society, and have little impact.

But then something comes along like the anti-Japanese protests that are taking place on the street where I live here in Beijing, and reminds me what I see in China’s NGOs.   We are already into our fourth day of protests, and I’ve been out to observe them every day.  Today is the biggest because September 18 marks the anniversary of the Mukden incident when the Japanese military invaded Manchuria, China’s northeast.  The protestors are chanting slogans telling the “little Japanese” to get out of the Diaoyu Islands, and calling for a boycott of Japanese goods (which many Chinese already own such as the cameras they are using to take pictures of the protests).   While the protests are generally peaceful, some protestors have taken to throwing plastic water bottles, eggs and other objects at the Japanese embassy which is just up the street from where I live.  In other cities, there have been acts of vandalism against Japanese-made cars and businesses.  Various sources – both foreigners and Chinese – have said that these protests are very organized, meaning not just that the protestors are well prepared, but that there is a scripted quality to these protests.   Here is an email one Chinese friend shared with me:

I just spoke with a taxi driver a moment ago. He told me that the protests are organized by the government. the leader of the village told the members what they can do in the protest, what they can not do. They can throw eggs, they can shout, but they cannot beat the Japanese, they cannot beat the police.  The government even buys eggs for them.

Like many other things going on in China, these protests and the security presence accompanying them are big, and they have impact.  But they are being manipulated by the government for cynical, political purposes, and are really doing nothing to address the many social problems that loom large for so many Chinese – the widening gap between rich and poor, the treatment of migrant workers and their families, the environmental and public health crises just around the corner.  They represent, in other words, everything that NGOs do not.  They lack integrity.

In a country where so much that happens is big and manipulated by powerful political or corporate interests, and actions that make an impact are a dime a dozen, integrity is becoming a rare commodity.  I think integrity is what draws me to China’s NGOs and why I’ve spent my last six year studying them and working for them.  Integrity.  It’s a commodity that is so difficult to find these days.  What does it mean?  For me, a commitment to a set of moral values, a set of progressive values.  A mission to better society.  But it is also about an approach to work that is evinced by sincerity and humility and a concern for the grassroots, for ordinary people and the communities in which they live.  It is an approach that is above all humane, a concern more for the process than for the result.  (Ironically, monitoring and evaluations of NGO projects tend to measure the quality of NGO work on the basis of outcomes, when what NGOs do best is process.)  Of course, not all NGOs have this quality.  Some are after fame (read: impact) and money, and others just after money.  But most of the grassroots NGOs I’ve met in China carry out their work with integrity.  They may not be the most professional, or the most effective, or make the biggest impact.  But that’s ok.  There’s already too much of that anyway.