Announcing China Development Brief's New Chinese NGO Directory and Special Report

China Development Brief recently published a new Chinese NGO Directory that is available online at www.chinadevelopmentbrief.cn and in print.  The bilingual (Chinese-English) Directory (with 251 NGO profiles and a Special Report: Mapping China's Public Interest NGOs) is one of the most important reports and publications that we have produced at CDB in many years. It took us more than one year to research, compile, translate and edit and is the first-ever public directory focused solely on grassroots Chinese NGOs. We hope it will serve as a valuable reference for anyone interested in NGOs in China.

Click here to download a free PDF copy of the Special Report and here to order a print version of the Directory.

Who’s Responsible for Watching Our Water?

One of the latest controversies in Chinese society has been the issue of groundwater pollution in Shandong and other provinces. Disillusioned by the ineffectuality of the government agencies responsible for monitoring pollution, a number of civil society advocates have emphasized the role of NGOs and the public in efforts to eradicate pollution.

The first public discussions about groundwater pollution began on the Weibo microblog in mid-February, when microblogging stars such as journalist Deng Fei circulated allegations that businesses in Weifang, Shandong were using high-pressure pumps to dispose of wastewater, leading to high levels of underground pollution that affect the quality of the region's drinking water. The Shandong Environmental Protection Bureau responded that it had examined the waste disposal methods of over 700 companies and failed to find any evidence of inappropriate methods, a claim widely pilloried by the public. This controversy quickly became part of a larger current of public critiques of Environmental Protection Bureaus throughout the country, including an offer of RMB 200,000 which a Zhejiang businessman extended to any Environmental Protection Bureau official willing to swim in a polluted local river.

In response, a number of local Environmental Protection Bureaus sought to defend their work. The Shandong Environmental Protection Bureau put out an open call to the public, offering a hefty reward for evidence of groundwater pollution. The Wenzhou Environmental Protection Bureau took out a full-page ad in a local newspaper, arousing further opprobrium for misuse of funds. China Daily released a number of articles lauding the services offered by the Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau, including an environmental protection hotline.  These efforts, however, were not enough to quell the growing tide of criticism directed at Environmental Protection institutions' failure to address the serious damage that industries are inflicting on the environment.

The fact remains that the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) is one of the country's weakest ministries, with little ability and, if rumors concerning corporate bribes aimed at MEP officials are true, little incentive to strong-arm wealthy, well-connected businessmen into following regulations. In a lawsuit recently submitted by a man whose son suffered from a lung disorder caused by proximity to a trash burning plant, he accused the Ministry of Environmental Protection of delaying a response to his queries until after major companies in the area had been consulted, violating an internal regulation that inquiries must receive a response within 15 days.

Disappointed with the government institutions intended to fight pollution, and conscious that local officials also frequently ignore environmental protection regulations in order to meet the economic development quotas which can determine their promotion, many civil society voices have turned to the role of the public and civil society institutions in fighting pollution. As laid out in a recent meeting of environmental NGOs, these include calling for transparency in government, utilizing public interest lawsuits, and encouraging public participation. If pollution data is openly reported, environmental NGO Nature University founder Feng Yongfeng emphasized that it will be easier for the public to call for a response from the relevant authorities, and more difficult for businesses to obfuscate the nature of the situation.

Unfortunately, another MEP scandal at the end of February, regarding its refusal to release data from a national soil contamination investigation in 2006, highlights the significant shortcomings in transparency and accountability in the environmental protection system. And while the newly revised environmental public interest lawsuit may well be a useful tool in addressing pollution damage, others have argued that China's weak legal system, and the lack of clarity in the civil procedure legislation, leave the mechanism ill-suited to taking on the large entities responsible for pollution.   

While all levels of government, businesses, and the public will have to participate in constructing a coherent response to pollution, the MEP stands as the conduit through which environmental protection action should take place. Time will tell whether the institution, only recently upgraded to ministerial level, will develop the ability to effectively monitor pollution, openly release its data, and work with the public, NGOs, and other parties to keep pollution damage in check.

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College Entrance Exam Woes for China's Migrant Children

Here is another View from the Media that was posted several weeks ago on China Development Brief's website that highlights the plight of China's migrant children.

Amanda Brown-Inz

CDB (English) Associate Director

 

In recent months, a considerable amount of media attention has focused on the plight of migrant workers' children seeking to attend public high school and take the college entrance exam (gaokao) in a location outside of their legal residency (hukou[1]). This issue highlights the tensions arising from China's rapid urbanization, and the stress that new geographic mobility places on the hukou system.

 

There are reportedly more than 400,000 migrant workers' children living in Beijing alone, approximately 16 million throughout the country, and these communities have become increasingly vocal about their right to attend public high school and test for university in their place of residence. In urban metropoles such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, the issue has been particularly heated, as universities maintain higher placement quotas for these in-demand locations, and many claim that urban families hope to maintain a monopoly on their privilege by excluding the children of migrant workers from gaokao competition.

 

The first public debate on this issue centered around Zhan Haite, the 15-year-old daughter of a migrant businessman in Shanghai, whose plea for policy reform was featured in an op-ed in the state-owned newspaper China Daily.  More recently, the debate in Beijing focused on a controversial plan issued in December of 2012 that would allow migrant workers' children to attend vocational colleges in the capital beginning in 2013, and allow them to matriculate at universities after graduating from vocational colleges beginning in 2014. 

 

The plan would allow policy makers to kill two birds with one stone, skirting the gaokao issue and acquiring pupils for the city's unpopular (and reportedly subpar) vocational colleges. Following a public outcry, however, the Beijing Municipal Commission of Education announced on January 21 that it would reconsider this plan and develop a new action plan to allow migrant youths in Beijing to take the gaokao. This action plan will include creating a management regulation for migrant workers' schools and a special fund to guarantee that migrant children receive compulsory education in Beijing.

 

In the meantime, the Beijing Bureau of Education has turned its attention to the unregistered schools which provide education to migrant children. While migrant children at the junior high school level and below are technically entitled to attend Beijing public schools, exorbitant entrance fees and weak educational backgrounds often prevent their enrollment. Thus, private schools for migrant children have sprung up in recent years, attempting to address the unique needs and situation of the children of migrant workers.

 

Despite the benefits of  (and obvious need for) these types of schools, Beijing education authorities have frequently been quite hostile to their operations. Migrant children's schools face a constant battle against government closure efforts, and must often rely on their relationships or on appeals to the media to keep their doors open. Authorities argue, however, that many of these schools are not up to national standards, lacking professional teachers and proper curricula, and thus should not be allowed to operate. In January, Chaoyang authorities shut down 18 private schools.

 

More interesting initiatives related to the development and professionalization of migrant children's schools have emerged from the private sector. Over the last couple of years, for instance, the Narada Foundation (南都基金会) has funded a New Citizens Program (新公民), which develops and professionalizes already extant migrant children's schools. The Maple Women's Psychological Counseling Center  has also recently announced the development of its Beijing Migrant Children's Education Plan, which will unite a number of NGOs (including New Citizens) to form the Beijing Migrant Children's Care Alliance, carrying out Training-of-Trainers and other programs.

 

The cause of gaokao qualification for the children of migrant workers is one in a growing chorus of critiques of the hukou registration system. The challenge for the government, which is reticent to dismantle the system, lies in testing how many exceptions and tweaks may be made to its infrastructure in response to social welfare concerns before it snaps. While the halting of the hukou system is far from certain, its navigation will hold a crucial place in the struggle for social welfare reform in upcoming years.

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[1] Hukou is the Chinese term for the household registration system which determines every Chinese citizen's legal residency. In this system every Chinese citizen registers in the city or town or township where they reside. Benefits such as medical insurance and access to public schools are tied to one's hukou and are not transferable. Thus, if someone moves to another city, such as Beijing, they generally do not receive those same benefits in their new place of residence, unless they are able to change their hukou. Getting your hukou transferred to a major city such as Beijing or Shanghai, however, is very difficult. As a result, the large majority of “migrants” in China's major cities lack the same status as hukou holders in those cities.

Getting Involved in the Nonprofit Community in Beijing - An Update

A while back I posted about different venues for getting involved in the nonprofit community for those living in Beijing. Some of these are no longer around, like Wokai Beijing Volunteer Chapters Drinks for a Better World event now that Wokai has closed shop. But others are going strong and there are some other emerging venues worthy of mention:

1) Beijing Community Dinner – BCD was started in 2007 and has been organizing dinners every two weeks at a Beijing restaurant specializing in Chinese regional cuisine.  Interested individuals can go for a meal and hear someone from a Chinese nonprofit talk about their work.  Diners pay for the meal and are encouraged to add a donation which goes to the nonprofit.  BCD has also organized several fieldtrips to visit selected nonprofits in Beijing. To get on their mailing list, go to their website to sign up.

BCD almost always gets very interesting speakers, many from Chinese NGOs, and is committed to making their events as inclusive as possible by keeping costs down, and is always looking for volunteers to help with their events.  To give you an idea of the events they put on, I post their most recent event here:

Migrant worker issues continues to remain on the agenda of the Chinese government, especially as we start the NPC and CPPCC sessions in Beijing this week.  We have 2 speakers from organizations providing services and legal aid to migrant workers.

- Mr Li (Tao):"Nong Min Gong Xie Zuo Zhe (Helper/Collaborator for Migrant Workers)"The Facilitator http://www.facilitator.ngo.cn/ , provides all kinds of services(i.e. legal aid, entertainment performances, training lectures, study groups etc.) for migrant workers to help them better integrate with cities where they work.  

- Mr Zhang (Zhi Qiang): Beijing Zhiqiang Legal Consultancy Service Center "Da Gong Zhi You(Friends of Migrant Workers)   http://www.gmxd.org.cn/ offers legal aids for migrant workers and he also cares about the development for schools built in cities for children of migrant workers.

Date: Sat, March 9

Please RSVP with us by Thurs, March 7 so we know how many people to expect.  Restaurant venue details will be sent separately.

As usual, we will have Crazy Bake bread for sale (RMB25 per loaf).  Enjoy bread freshly-made by patients at the Chaoyang Mental Health Clinic in Tongzhou.

Heads up for our next dinner (Sat, March 23)

In the current age of collective and industrialized breeding, animal welfare seems to take second place to production schedules and profit.  We invite a representative from Compassion in World Farming (CIWF, http://www.ciwf.org.uk) to speak to BCD about global trends and China's role in food production.

2) FYSE -  Andrea Krause has been working hard over the last few years to expand the trainings and talks offered by FYSE and regularly hosts valuable training sessions and talks (full disclosure: I gave one on NGOs in China last month). Following is a post about this month's talk, given by no less than Andrea herself.

[Beijing] Introduction to social enterprises in China
March 27, 2013

RSVP required to events@fyse.org

FYSE invites you to learn about and discuss the current state of, as well as challenges and opportunities for social enterprise in China.

China’s development is at a critical stage. The country faces increasing social, economic and environmental challenges in diverse areas such as education, healthcare and water. Social entrepreneurs are providing solutions that tackle these challenges by combining a social mission with a sustainable business model.

On March 27, 2013  FYSE invites you to discuss the current state of social enterprises in China featuring the findings from FYSE's 2012 China Social Enterprise Report.

The Speakers
Andrea Lane, Founder and Executive Director, FYSE
Andrea founded FYSE in 2008, and grew it into a cutting-edge organization that currently provides support to social entrepreneurs in 10 countries in Asia. Andrea has extensive start-up and management experience in various Asian countries including Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Hong Kong and Malaysia.

FYSE's mission is to support social entrepreneurs who have the potential to significantly address social and environmental challenges. The organization has a track record of managing regional and national projects in Asia through multi-stakeholder collaborations with a wide network of partners including companies, educational institutions and nongovernmental organizations.

3) Public Interest Happy Hour - For those interesting in learning more about the nonprofit space in a more casual setting, this event may be just the ticket. It's a new event being organized by Aurora Bewicke, who works for the international NGO, International Bridges for Justice. Here are the details:

Public Interest Happy Hour The Year of the Snake has arrived and it is once again warm enough to venture outside. In celebration of the warming weather, I’m loosely organizing (in other words, sending out this email) a happy hour for Tuesday, March 12, 2013, from 7-9pm. The theme is public interest, with an aim of bringing together those working in NGOs, rule of law, embassies, etc., but feel free to pass the invite along to anyone who would like to come. Location: Bar Veloce Date: Tuesday, March 12, 2013 Time: 7-9 The last happy hour had about 20 people and I assume this one will also gather a good crowd. If you get a chance, send me an RSVP (aurora_bewicke@yahoo.com) so that I can let the bar know approximately how many to expect, but feel free to decide last minute as well. If you wish to be removed from future emails, just let me know. For directions and information about the location: http://www.cityweekend.com.cn/beijing/listings/restaurants/wine_spirits/has/bar-veloce/ Sanlitun 三里屯 Courtyard 4 (opposite west entrance of 1949 - The Hidden City), Gongti Beilu, Chaoyang District 朝阳区工体北路4号院（1949西门对面） 6586 1006 Best wishes, Aurora

Orphanages, Homeless Shelters and the NGO Space in China

I'm reposting a new China Development Brief feature, written by CDB(English)'s Associate Directory, Amanda Brown-Inz, which looks at major Chinese media stories having to do with the civil society space in China.

 

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As a supplement to CDB's Weekly Civil Society News feature, we are launching View from the Media, a weekly column which will summarize and provide analysis of some of the major stories concerning civil society that appear in the Chinese media.

This week, we begin with two cases that sparked widespread controversy in the field: the Lankao Fire Incident and the "Two Freezing to Death" Incident. Both cases draw attention to concerns about government handling of social welfare programming, and to anxieties about the navigation of spaces outside of government administration.

 

I

 

The Lankao Fire Incident refers to a fire that occurred in Lankao County, Henan, on January 4. It was discovered that 7 orphans, who were living under the care of a woman named Yuan Lihai, perished in the fire. Further investigation revealed that Yuan Lihai ran an unofficial, unregistered orphanage that was nonetheless utilized by local authorities in the county, which lacked an official welfare facility for orphans or abandoned children. According to reports, although both the public and the authorities were aware of substandard living conditions in the orphanage and felt that it was "only a matter of time" before this sort of tragedy would befall Yuan Lihai, the orphanage operated for more than 20 years and received financial and material support from the county government.

 

The spark of media coverage following the fire brought national attention to this incident, and also brought to light a number of similar shortfalls around the country. According to one article, after news of the Lankao affairs prompted the Guangdong provincial government to investigate the quality of public facilities for orphans and abandoned children, an official in Guangdong, whose county had speciously claimed to operate a state-mandated orphanage, sought to "borrow" orphans from a local temple. Of the 2,853 counties in China, the Ministry of Civil Affairs found that only 64 possessed child welfare facilities. The childcare centers in Aid Stations (救助站), present in a number of counties including Lankao, were deemed unsatisfactory even by local officials (for reasons elucidated in the following section).

 

While it is unclear precisely what sort of response will unfold in the wake of the incident, the Lankao fire raised a number of issues that will affect both local governments and non-governmental service providers. The lack of proper state welfare facilities for orphans and abandoned children has drawn widespread criticism, leading the Ministry of Civil Affairs to pledge assistance in the creation of 500 counties by 2015. As for the private orphanages caring for more than 80 percent of the country's 615,000 reported orphans, it is inclear whether the incident will lead local Civil Affairs Bureaus to develop official relationships with these facilities through procurement of services as hoped by some, or whether government efforts will focus on eradicating the operation of illegal orphanages. 

 

II

 

The second case receiving widepread media attention this week was the case of two homeless men in Changsha, Hunan who froze to death after repeatedly refusing to go to Aid Stations for care. While the initial response from officials seems to have been that the state should not be held liable for the deaths of these men, who chose not to seek help, the case was further complicated by later reports of an undercover journalist who was beaten by Aid Station employees. The employees claimed that they suspected he was mentally ill and perhaps carrying a weapon, and explained that they were trying to restrain him. As a former MCA official stated, however, such a response would be inappropriate regardless of the suspect's mental state.

 

The official, Tang Jun, explained in an interview that many of the issues with Aid Stations stem from their previous incarnations as part of the Shelter and Repatriation System (收容遣返制度), which was developed to deal with errant migrant workers in a time when workers were just beginning to leave their homes en masse to seek employment in other provinces. Criticism of the Shelter and Repatriation System led to its disbanding in 2003, when the stations were converted into Aid Stations. Unfortunately, Tang explained, many of the staff have retained their violent habits, and the stations often continue to serve their original purpose of shipping migrants home rather than offering them shelter.

 

The responses to this case seem to be two-fold, and may cause both positive and negative repercussions. On one hand, the Ministry of Civil Affairs has made efforts to educate Aid Station personnel as to the proper protocol in dealing with these types of situations, so as to make the Aid Stations more hospitable to the homeless. On the other hand, the vows of preventing this sort occurrence may lead to further strong-arming of the homeless into Aid Station facilities, as homeless deaths are felt to reflect poorly on the state. Finally, on the transparency front, a Changsha lawyer has requested that the Aid Station release its financial information, demonstrating a desire among the public to "keep watch" on the stations' activities.

 

These cases highlight the complex navigation of social welfare provision in the 21^st century, as the public becomes increasingly vocal about expectations that the government will provide adequate social services. In some cases, the government may accept direct responsibility for the operation of these services, but the discussion of "social management innovation" in the 16^th – 18^th Congress reports indicates that the government will begin to rely on the procurement of social services from social organizations. Regardless of which route the government chooses, the focus on social welfare will have significant repercussions for the numerous non-government organizations who currently fill these roles, and for the groups they serve. Non-government service provision organizations will likely receive more supervision from government agencies or face serious restrictions of the scope of their work, and disadvantaged groups will find that their welfare is of greater concern to local government officials. 

 

By Amanda Brown-Inz,

Associate Director, China Development Brief (English)

A New Dawn For Civil Society After the 18th Party Congress?

I'm reposting a Policy Brief I posted on China Development Brief more than a month ago. In two more weeks, the National People's Congress will be held here in Beijing and Xi Jinping, the new General Secretary of the Communist Party will be anointed as the next President of the People's Republic of China.

POLICY BRIEF NO. 12 (December 2012): A New Dawn After the 18^th Party Congress?

After the 18^th Party Congress, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, who have been anointed to become the new president and premier respectively (they will assume these positions after the next National People’s Congress in March of 2013) made a number of public appearances that gave observers some optimism that the new leadership will be supportive of reforms strengthening China’s civil society, but we will have to wait and see if they follow up with actions, and not just words.

Xi made a trip to the more freewheeling southern province of Guangdong to promote the reforms being carried out there. He also spoke on the 30^th anniversary of the 1982 revision to the Constitution, calling for officials to do more to protect citizen rights, including human rights, and promote public confidence in the law. "We must firmly establish, throughout society, the authority of the Constitution and the law and allow the overwhelming masses to fully believe in the law," he said. In a separate meeting with HIV/AIDS activists, Li Keqiang called for the government to provide more support, specifically in terms of registration and funding, to grassroots NGOs engaged in combating HIV/AIDS.

Two other developments caught the media’s eye this month that deserve our attention. One is the government’s effort to build a foundation for government contracting to NGOs, and the other is an effort at the local level to create a “hub” system to better support and manage NGOs. The first effort is important because it heralds a new era of state-NGO collaboration, albeit on the state’s terms, and offers cash-strapped NGOs a new source of funding. The second is significant because it represents an effort by the local party-state to bring NGOs under their big tent.

Government contracting to NGOs will receive a big boost with the historic decision by the central government to set up a RMB 200 million (USD 32 million) fund in 2013 to purchase social services from social organizations. In line with this announcement, the Ministry of Civil Affairs has issued a “2013 Project Implementation Plan for the Government Financial Support of Social Organizations' Participation in Social Services”, and the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the Ministry of Finance have jointly issued a set of guidelines about how this fund will be used.

In the other development, the Guangdong provincial government, following in the footsteps of an earlier experiment in Beijing, is putting in place a “hub” system that will use “people’s organizations” such as the Communist Youth League and Women’s Federation, which enjoy close ties to the party-state, as a vehicle for supporting and managing NGOs.

Can the Chinese Government Both Support and Micromanage NGOs?

Here's one of the Policy Briefs I wrote for China Development Brief in November. It's about whether the Chinese government can have it both ways. It want to support the development of NGOs, but at the same time, closely manage and supervise that developmental process. But doesn't the latter ultimately subvert the former? Here's what I said:

In the run-up to the 18^th Party Congress which opened November 8 and ended November 15 with the announcement of China’s new leadership core, the news falls into two categories of policy trends that we have been seeing over this past year.

The first of these trends involves policies that are more supportive of social organizations, the official term in China for nonprofits or NGOs.  These policies come in different forms.  One is the continuation of reforms at the local level to make registration easier for social organizations. This month, much of the news has been about reforms in the wealthy eastern province of Zhejiang, such as the cities of Ningbo and Wenzhou. Another policy involves local governments, in places like Guangdong and Sichuan, setting up special funds to support and incubate social organizations and contract services to social organizations. More localities are financing these special funds using public welfare lottery money.  Some environmental NGOs, however, have found that the funds used for purchasing services from social organizations are not sufficient to carry out their projects.
The second trend involves policies seeking to better regulate and manage the social organization sector. We have seen some of these policies and guidelines come out over the last few months. This month, we hear about other methods the government is using to standardize the sector. Both the Ministry of Civil Affairs and local Civil Affairs bureaus are providing ratings to registered social organizations, although it is not clear what goes into creating these ratings. With a 3A-level rating or above from the Ministry, a social organization may receive awards, and is given priority for government contracting. With a 4A-level rating or above, an organization can undergo a simplified process for its yearly inspection.  An organization’s rating is good for a three-year period and is based on a 1000 point rating system.

Ratings may not be a bad idea if done correctly, but another method that has been making the news is the Party’s efforts to become involved in managing social organizations. We touched on this in our last Policy Brief where we discussed the role of the Social Affairs Committee which is a newly formed agency under the local Party Committee responsible for social affairs which includes the development of social organizations. This month, we continue to hear more news about efforts to establish Party branches and groups within social organizations. This trend would mean both the government and Party would be involved in supervising social organizations.

It is not clear how the government and Party would coordinate their specific roles and responsibilities, but the involvement of both Party and government bureaucracies in managing social organizations is not a good sign. It runs counter to the first trend of supporting social organizations and making it easier for them to operate. Perhaps the Party and government see their efforts to manage social organizations as a good faith, paternalistic gesture to provide guidance and support. But they could also be interpreted as micromanagement, and an attempt to exercise stricter supervision over social organizations. As one article in the People’s Daily, the Communist Party’s mouthpiece, makes clear, “loosening restrictions” over social organizations does not mean authorities should “become lax or complacent”.

Micromanagement not withstanding, some observers have been optimistic about the future for social organizations after the 18^th Party Congress.  Professor Wang Ming, director of Tsinghua University’s NGO Research Center and one of the leading authorities on China’s NGOs, is bullish on the future for social organizations, noting that the 18^th Party Congress continued the same strong support for social organizations expressed at the 17^th Party Congress in 2007.