As we approach the much ballyhooed Third Plenum, here's my latest Policy Brief commenting on regulatory trends in the NGO sector and thoughts about what the Third Plenum should bring for China's NGOs.
In our last Policy Brief issued December 2012, we noted the
continuation of “social management innovation” initiatives after the 18th Party Congress. The general idea behind “social management innovation,” which is also mentioned prominently in the 12th
Five Year Plan (2011-2015), is to encourage the party-state at all
levels to be more proactive in reaching out to NGOs (or what the
government calls “social organizations”) in addressing common social
goals. The party-state recognizes that it cannot address all of China’s
daunting social problems and is beginning to realize the value of
working with NGOs to provide social services to better “serve the
people.”
We are now a few days away from the critical Third Plenum of the 18th
Communist Party of China’s (CPC) Central Committee. The Third Plenum
has historically been the meeting at which major reforms have been
launched. What can we expect for social management innovations in the
NGO sector after the Third Plenum? Our answer: more or less a
continuation of what we have seen in recent years.
Over the last few years, social management innovations undertaken by
the central and local governments have been quickening. Those
innovations have generally come in three forms. One is reforms to lower
barriers to NGO registration for certain categories of NGOs. A second
is the ramping up of government contracting of social services to NGOs.
A third is building the capacity and professionalism of NGOs by
providing support services and creating standards for the sector. These
three areas are interrelated. In order to compete for government
contracts, NGOs will need to meet a number of requirements, such as
being registered, having qualified staff, and being able to meet
reporting requirements. Currently, the government is having difficulty finding enough qualified NGOs
to bid on social service contracts. Recent measures to ease
registration requirements and provide capacity-building support for NGOs
are therefore meant to enlarge the pool of qualified NGOs.
Since last December, these “innovations” have continued apace as
governments, government agencies and even GONGOs at different levels
strive to come up with their own initiatives. While the desire to
innovate might be thought to be synonymous with the desire to be
different, most of these initiatives predictably fall into one of the
three forms discussed above. (Perhaps we should not expect anything
more from a top-down mandate to innovate.)
In terms of registration reforms, a number of well-placed sources including the State Council, MoCA officials and academics
have suggested that the revised national-level regulations for
registration of social organizations, which have been eagerly
anticipated for a number of years, should be ready by the end of the
year. We may then expect to hear an announcement after the Third Plenum
about these revised regulations. There have also been high-level
signals that regulations for international NGOs
will be forthcoming, but we think this is less likely given the
sensitivity of international NGOs working in China, though it would be a
pleasant surprise if it did happen.
In addition to the national level, there are reportedly 19 provinces
now carrying out trial regulations allowing NGOs to register directly
with Civil Affairs. If Beijing and Guangdong are any indication,
however, the implementation of these trial measures has not been smooth.
In Beijing, many NGOs still are unable to register directly with Civil
Affairs. In Guangdong, many registered NGOs still do not get
preferential tax treatment. It should also be reiterated that these
reforms are aimed at certain categories of NGOs, generally economic and
trade associations, public benefit and charitable organizations, and
social service organizations. As one commentator stated, political and legal NGOs should not bother applying. The closing down of the Transition Socio-Economic Research Institute (Chuanzhixing) in July would be a case in point.
Regarding government contracting, contracting appears to be quite
decentralized and taking place through different agencies. In Beijing,
the Social Affairs Committee is carrying out contracting, and Civil
Affairs is providing funding for NGOs to hire certified social workers
in an effort to professionalize the sector. At the central and local
levels, a portion of the Welfare Lottery (gongyi caipiao) is being used
to contract social services. Even mass organizations such as the Beijing
Federation of Trade Unions are getting into the contracting act. In
terms of implementation, it is unclear if there are sector-wide
standards and procedures for contracting, and there is a lack of
transparency with some claiming government contracting takes place in a “black box”. There
are allegations of “rent-seeking” in which “qualified” organizations
receive government funding only to outsource it to other social
organizations after first taking a cut. Finally, there is a widespread perception that the government tends to contract out to “insider” NGOs such as GONGOs, rather than to grassroots NGOs.
Finally, local governments and party organizations are setting up a
number of different platforms and organizations, and proposing more
detailed standards and norms for the sector. These include “hub”-style
organizations built on the old mass organizations, and incubation bases
to offer support and guidance to NGOs and cultivate new ones. One
interesting example of a “hub” organization that seems new and
innovative is the China Charity Alliance,
which is being created under the auspices of the China Charity Donation
and Information Center, a GONGO set up under the Ministry of Civil
Affairs. The Alliance’s aim seems to be to promote the philanthropic
sector by bringing in business tycoons and celebrities as members. (When
this author asked one of the organizers of the Alliance about whether
CDB could join, I was politely informed that the Alliance was only
inviting large, influential organizations and individuals.)
So far, so good. The news about the lowering of barriers to
registration is welcome, and the NGO sector needs clearer regulation and
more support from the government. But then came the spring and summer
months of 2013 when activists in central China and Beijing were arrested
or detained for calling for government officials to disclose their
assets. Following that were detentions and arrests of activists
associated with the New Citizen Movement in July, the closing down of the Transition Research Institute,
an independent think-tank, and broader restrictions on social media and
the ideological atmosphere. This year’s crackdown is not an isolated
event. If we think back to 2012, we can also recall the harassment of labor NGOs in Guangdong. Clearly the call for social innovation does not always extend to those seeking to innovate from the bottom up.
These recent crackdown on civil society advocates seem to run counter
to the social management innovations that are expanding the space for
NGOs. But maybe there is a way to reconcile these seemingly
contradictory trends. Perhaps what we are seeing is an agreement within
the Chinese leadership to depoliticize the NGO sector. Some may argue
that this arrangement has already been in place for a while: after all,
the government actively discourages NGOs engaged in political or
rights-based legal work. But the difference this time is that
depoliticization is also being encouraged using positive incentives.
Thus the thrust of social management innovation may be to create
top-down, institutionalized partnerships with NGOs that fall into
“acceptable” categories such as social service provision, seeking to
guide, support and thereby co-opt them. At the same time, the
government will not extend the same treatment to more “critical” NGOs
and activists engaged in advocacy and more sensitive issues; on the
contrary, it will make life more difficult for them.
Recently, one civil society scholar warned against allowing China’s
third sector to grow while its civil society diminishes. We should keep
these words in mind as we monitor developments in civil society over the
next year.
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