This
post is part 1 of a guest blog by Ryan Etzcorn, a Fulbright Research Fellow
(2018-2019) and a graduate of the University of Michigan’s Gerald R. Ford
School of Public Policy and Lieberthal-Rogel Center for Chinese Studies (MPP
& MA).
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By the end of 2018, I grew pretty comfortable with the bullet
train commute between Guangzhou and Shenzhen. The past 40 years of Reform and
Opening Up have transformed this corridor into one of the most important
economic regions in the world. Throughout the Pearl River Delta, regional
leaders take every opportunity to parade their proud tradition of leadership in
manufacturing, technology, and record-breaking infrastructure. In this corner
of China, the obsession with “breakthrough innovation” has advanced to feel
like a regional pastime. But to some of the region’s Party-state
leaders and private “social entrepreneurs”, breaking down barriers of time and
space for more GDP is not enough. Instead, these leaders have re-dedicated
themselves to a paradigm shift which seeks to erode sectoral barriers between
government, business, and charity for the provision of “public benefit” (gongyi).
In both Shenzhen and Guangzhou, social
workers, business leaders, leading government officials, and academics are
collaborating in WeChat groups, conferences, and salon discussions and using
the same slogans to emphasize a more coordinated era of “public governance.” It
is time, they say, to heed Xi Jinping’s call for “collective community building, collective governance, and
collective sharing” and use it to replace the
tired government/business/nonprofit sectoral boundaries of bygone eras and
foreign origins. Under the leadership of the Party, “participatory” community
governance will finally be realized, starting with Guangdong.
As both a researcher and practitioner, I arrived in August of 2018 on a research fellowship to explore how new developments in Chinese policy and law were propelling changes in the fabric of its civil society. Before that, in the years leading up to the paired release of the Charity Law and Overseas NGO Law in 2016, I spent two years of a graduate program at the University of Michigan examining Chinese civil society from several angles, including archival work and interviews with grassroots organizations across China. The passing of those two highly anticipated laws came and went and I chose Guangzhou and Shenzhen to study their implementation.
As both a researcher and practitioner, I arrived in August of 2018 on a research fellowship to explore how new developments in Chinese policy and law were propelling changes in the fabric of its civil society. Before that, in the years leading up to the paired release of the Charity Law and Overseas NGO Law in 2016, I spent two years of a graduate program at the University of Michigan examining Chinese civil society from several angles, including archival work and interviews with grassroots organizations across China. The passing of those two highly anticipated laws came and went and I chose Guangzhou and Shenzhen to study their implementation.
For me, the rationale for wanting to
study new “public benefit” (gongyi)
developments in Guangzhou and Shenzhen felt obvious. Both are situated under
the same national and provincial laws and regulations. Other Guangdong cities
have been notable for standout social policy experimentation, but the
province's top rank in philanthropic giving has much to do with its
two mega cities. Guangdong also boasts special funds for social
organization capacity building and trails only Jiangsu Province in the sheer
number of social organizations that have been registered to date.
Both Shenzhen and Guangzhou have more in
common with each other than either does with most other Chinese cities, and yet
some contrasts in public welfare delivery regimes remain profound. The much
older city of Guangzhou is known in the region for more than 450
state-engineered “family integrated social service stations” providing
wrap-around services that are administered by China’s largest legion of social
workers. In comparison to Shenzhen, Guangzhou is importantly recognized for the
more exclusive role that government plays in resourcing and fostering social
organizations.
The younger, sleeker Shenzhen is known
as a hotbed for major technology firms and real estate investment. Huge tech
companies and Hong Kong cross-border flows provide more diverse options for
social organization funding, even while the Ministry of Finance has pushed
special pilot efforts to rationalize and strengthen government procurement of
social services. Shenzhen also sprang into action early with one of the first
local governments in China to capitalize a series of community
foundations. Along with Shanghai, Beijing, and Chengdu, Shenzhen’s government
has subsidized social impact investment pilot projects, subsidized fixed costs
for social enterprises, and even issued social impact bonds. Although
clear differences persist, the backdrop they provide makes commonalities in
policy design even more notable and potentially telling for broader trends in
the PRC.
Shaping a sector: introducing “hub-style organizations”
Amidst the blur of WeChat zines and
conference forums I attended since Fall 2018, an obvious pattern of
institutional leadership emerged across both cities. Surprisingly, it wasn’t
quite the government itself nor the grassroots groups holding the microphone or
building most of the WeChat groups. Instead, it looked like I was witnessing a
takeover by the organizations “in between”. In China’s current social sector,
to be a “hub-style organization” (shuniu xing zuzhi)
has become a term of pride that resembles a notion of being higher up in a sort
of institutional “value chain”.
In the past month, I spoke with leaders
at state-backed “social organization institutes”, city-wide social
organization associations, the Ministry
of Civil Affairs (MoCA), grassroots groups, and leading “mission-oriented”
consulting groups in both Shenzhen and Guangzhou. My first rounds of
interviewing distinguished two major types that were viewed as key for building
financial capacity and sustainability among grassroots groups:
quasi-governmental associations and incubator bases. Both of these hub
categories are managed on some level by government institutions or other
quasi-state institutions, such as the All-China Federation for Women or the
Communist Youth League.
Social organization associations, social
organization “institutes“, and charity federations collectively make up the
first category that are mostly registered as civil non-enterprise units, though
they actually function as directly-reporting auxiliaries of specific bureaus or
departments within the MoCA.[1]
Though they mostly exist at the city level, district versions also exist in
both Shenzhen and Guangzhou. Each of the three types in this category also
served as a “platform” by convening social organizations, producing research
and propaganda for social organization consumption, disseminating data on the
sector, or providing free training services. Social organization associations
in particular are being increasingly tasked with serving as a depository for
annual reports required of all registered organizations, where the data is
pooled and later conveyed to the MoCA.
Incubators make up the second category
and are established by local government initiatives at the city, district, and
sub-district levels in both Shenzhen and Guangzhou. They also represent a more
collaborative approach combining state subsidies, operating contracts with
civil non-enterprise units, in-kind donations from local businesses, and
training services from professional consulting firms like NPI. Without
fail, every incubator felt obliged to stress that participation in an incubator
space does not merely provide office space, but also includes opportunities for
training and “resource docking” opportunities (fundraising training,
grant-writing, or help with government procurement applications).
For many organizations, these hub
organizations are key forums both for demonstrating loyalty to the Party and
gaining access to critical resources. Both categories of hub-style organization
are charged with promoting “Party-building” among their member institutions,
and those grassroots organizations that are amenable to creating Party
committees and networking those committees are systematically favored by
evaluation criteria and access to hub-provided resources. Service-oriented
(non-advocacy) organizations with missions that match local government goals
are also favored by incubators that provide subsidized resources. Even social
organization interviewees that expressed wariness toward government cooptation
earnestly wished they could get a coveted spot in an incubator, if only for the
substantial benefits, like free rent or help with registration. The problem now
is that most incubators have been at capacity for two years or more in these
two cities, with long waiting lists for entry.
In part 2 of this blogpost,
Ryan will discuss how “hub-style” organizations are being utilized by the
Party-state, covering two main themes: cross-sector coordination and “building
capacity.”
This blog is not an official
site of the Fulbright Program or the U.S. Department of State. The views
expressed in this blogpost are entirely Ryan’s and do not represent the views
of the Fulbright Program, the U.S. Department of State, or any of its partner
organizations.
[1] Social Organization Associations
and Social Organization Institutes operate under the the Social Organization
Management Bureau at the municipal-level MoCA for each city, though the social
organization Institute in Shenzhen was initiated by a combination of the social
organization Association and Charity Federation, which are directly supervised
by MoCA. According to interviews and official info, the Guangzhou
Charity Federation is directly supervised by the Emergency Relief & Charity
Affairs Office at the municipal-level MoCA. In Shenzhen, the Charity Federation
is directly supervised by the
municipal MoCA, but not by any particular office of the municipal MoCA, like in
Guangzhou.
